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ABSTRACT 
New Zealand, like many other countries, 1s seeking to improve its living standards. 
Politically, considerable effort is being expended in achieving this improvement by 
encouraging the pursuit of "efficiency" in the use of resources of all descriptions by those 
most able to use them. Recently, successive governments have considered "light handed" 
policies, an expression this paper will explain in due course, are appropriate to achieve such 
efficiency. This paper examines some issues arising from light handed legislative incentives 
to provide for efficiency through competition. Particularly, this paper will look at the level of 
success Section 36 of the Commerce Act 1986 enjoys in guaranteeing access to resources 
described as Essential Facilities. This paper adopts a narrow definition of Essential Facilities. 
Essential Facilities are former state owned network facilities which largely still occupy 
monopoly positions. Essential Facilities are increasingly facing competition at the same time 
as their traditional status as state owned network facilities is changing through deregulation 
and privatisation. This paper reveals there are strong academic and commercial doubts that 
Section 36 is able to guarantee access to Essential Facilities. By treating "access" as a key 
concept and concentrating narrowly on issues of denial of access and pricing of access, this 
paper similarly expresses strong doubts that the political aspirations for Section 36 to 
guarantee access to Essential Facilities are being met. This paper will include some 
comparative comment from, particularly, Australia and its treatment of issues of access to 
Essential Facilities. Such comment will reveal that if competition achieves efficiency and 
stimulates economic growth and initiative, then the Australian position is that access to 
Essential Facilities similarly needs to be specifically facilitated to assist the competition 
process. By comparison Section 36, is not facilitative and consequently is not adequate to 
guarantee access is available to Essential Facilities in New Zealand. This paper will also 
consider steps other than resort to Section 36, which could be taken to improve the adequacy 
of access to Essential Facilities. 
The text of this paper ( excluding Contents page, footnotes, bibliography and annexures) 
comprises approximately 16,000 words. 
L>:;' 1 1·: •' ,'\ 
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I INTRODUCTION 
1. An Overview 
1.1 In recent years New Zealand has undergone a political facelift. One 
consequence has been that intensive and specific regulation of industry and 
commerce has become unfashionable. Instead, "light handed" regulation 
has been favoured. The political intention of light handed regulation has 
been to promote competition as a regulator of business relationships. By 
retaining few legislative or regulatory barriers to competition, the political 
intention has been to encourage an efficient use of resources within the 
business community. 1 
1.2 Specifically, the Commerce Act 19862 provides New Zealand's 
predominant regulatory framework to encourage business efficiency. The 
Act is designed to promote competition within markets in New Zealand, on 
the basis that rivalry between firms ensures maximum efficiency in the use 
of resources. 3 
1.3 Successive governments have expressed their intentions that the Act also 
regulate competition where Essential Facilities, sometimes called natural 
monopolies, exist.4 Historically, Essential Facilities in New Zealand have 
not been exposed to competition and popularly have included such as state 
entities and have been protected by statute accordingly. Now however, 
Essential Facilities are increasingly being deregulated and also privatised, to 
both traditional and new participants. These steps will not immediately 
alter the apparent monopolistic characteristics of Essential Facilities so that 
See, for example, Government Policy Statement, December 1991 , regarding the Telecommunications 
markets, quoted in Patterson R H, Competition Issues for Natural Monopolies and Essential Facilities, 
Utility Markets Summit Wellington 27/28 April I 995. 
Called in this paper "the Act" . 
See Tru Tone Limited v Festival Records Retail Marketing Limited [ 1988] 2 NZLR 352:358. 
But see this paper's definition following in section 2 of this paper. 
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arguably, governmental reliance upon the Act to regulate competition for 
efficiency purposes within these areas appears incongruous. 
1.4 In explanation, whilst the Act is designed to promote competition, 
conversely, the Act also limits certain behaviour which for purposes of the 
Act is regarded as being uncompetitive or monopolistic. Section 36 of the 
Act proscribes the extent to which monopolistic behaviour is tolerated. 
This paper canvasses whether the Act and Section 36 in particular, as an 
example of contemporary light handed legislation, effectively assists or 
implements the political aspirations of encouraging competition within 
Essential Facilities. More particularly, this paper will concentrate on 
determining whether Section 36 is adequate to guarantee access to Essential 
Facilities. 5 
1.5 A number of arguments will be discussed. First, in terms of a definition of 
Essential Facilities,6 a New Zealand definition will be attempted.7 The 
structural and ownership characteristics of Essential Facilities in New 
Zealand have altered substantially. Even in the United States of America 
the ambit of Essential Facilities has never been universally acknowledged, 
indicating a lack of understanding and acceptance of the concepts. 
Accordingly this paper will establish its own definition of Essential 
Facilities for purposes of the arguments which follow. Secondly, adherence 
to light handed legislation is a relatively new phenomenon in New Zealand, 
where formerly stringent regulation prevailed. Consequently, the business 
community has taken some time to familiarise itself with both the strengths 
and weaknesses of legislation of the nature of Section 36 and arguably 
commercial uncertainty and confusion has resulted. Further, while Section 
In considering "access" to Essential Facilities, this paper is proceeding on the basis that "access" is 
pursued in the furthering of the promotion of competition, that is, access is sought and given on a 
competitive basis. 
Note, this requires inquiry of facilities which can be described as "essential". It is not directed towards 
defining the "Essential Facilities Doctrine" . The Doctrine will be considered in section 6 of this paper. 
"Essential Facilities" as a term arose first in the United States of America. The adoption of the term in 
New Zealand without giving consideration to political social and judicial distinctions between the two 
countries may be inappropriate. 
WG95 1420.05 lslp2v4o+ 
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36 is expressed broadly, a lack of specificity and also recent case law 
indicates judicial confusion as to the ambit and effects of the section also 
exists. An analysis of Section 36 will be undertaken to attempt to resolve 
the uncertainty. Thirdly, this paper will examine concepts of access to 
Essential Facilities and particularly the adequacy of access when considered 
against first, the definition of Essential Facilities as adopted in this paper 
and secondly the real or imagined confusion created by the interpretation 
and application of Section 36. Whilst each of the arguments this paper will 
discuss could be considered as separate topics, in this paper, access issues 
are a key concept. Accordingly, this paper argues both denial of access and 
pricing of access issues require careful consideration. "Sufficiency" of 
access, similarly, requires examination. This paper argues access issues in 
these terms are currently topical in view of the difficulties of providing 
uniform procedures to observe and to facilitate access. 8 Finally, this paper 
argues there are if not alternatives to Section 36, then certainly 
complementary mechanisms which operate. On this basis, a specific access 
regime can be sustained without prejudice to the political aspirations of 
"efficiency" in the use of resources. 
1.6 It is anticipated the arguments this paper will discuss can best be examined 
by discussion and reference to examples as appropriate. Some comparative 
material from, particularly, Australia will be considered. The Trade 
Practices Act 1974 (Australia) Section 46, being comparable legislation to 
Section 36, will be examined as will the Australian attitude towards access 
issues. This paper draws together the arguments set out in the preceding 
paragraphs and argues a number of conclusions are likely. First, Essential 
Facilities have a specific definition. Access to Essential Facilities therefore 
needs to meet any specific requirements of that definition. Secondly, 
Section 36 is rather too "light handed" and is not sufficiently facilitative to 
guarantee access to Essential Facilities. Thirdly, the adequacy ofregulating 
See Telecom Corporation of New Zealand Limited v Clear Communications Limited [ 1995] I NZLR 
385, access issues difficulties are clearly defined. 
WG951420.05 lslp3v4o+ 
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the consequences of denial of access and imprecision in pricing of access 
has not reached an acceptable level. Australia favours the introduction of 
specific access legislation. Whilst specific access legislation in New 
Zealand may seem to conflict with political aspirations of efficiency and the 
best use of resources, this paper also concludes that the presence of 
alternatives or complements to Section 36 indicates that there is sufficient 
goodwill to enable a specific access regime to operate in New Zealand. 
This paper will now develop these arguments in the following sections. 
- 5 -
II ELEMENTS OF THE EQUATION 
2. Essential Facilities Defined 
2.1 "Essential Facilities"9 is a term often encountered in the competition law 
environment. It is not inaccurate however, to assert that a consistent and 
universally accepted definition of the term is more illusory than real. Yet, it 
is necessary to define Essential Facilities and to examine the origins of the 
contemporary definition to provide, first, an appreciation of the types of 
facilities which might be essential but secondly, to provide a focus for the 
arguments which follow. Given the areas upon which this paper seeks to 
concentrate however, this section will discuss these matters much more 
summarily than would a paper devoted exclusively to an examination of 
Essential Facilities. The emphasis will be to provide a definition of 
Essential Facilities which is relevant to New Zealand. This will mean that 
examples of Essential Facilities in the United States of America, where the 
concept of an essential facility first arose, may not be treated similarly in 
this country. 
2.2 Despite a hesitancy to unquestioningly accept an United States of America 
definition in New Zealand, a consideration of the conceptual ~d case law 
origins from that country must be made. Essenti,:il Facilities arise in the 
context of economic activities, but a concise description is impossible. 
Current opinion holds that Essential Facilities display natural monopoly 
characteristics. Consequently, such facilities can not be economically 
duplicated. That is, from a competition viewpoint, to duplicate the 
particular facility would not make any economic sense unless the particular 
This section defines "Essential Facilities" for purposes of this paper. This section is not commenting 
on or intending to comment on the Essential Facilities Doctrine. The Doctrine will be considered in 
Section 6. 
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facility was virtually exhausted as to capacity. Duplication otherwise 
would be wasteful and inefficient10. 
2.3 Whilst academically convenient, some difficulties anse with such a 
definition. Essential Facilities and natural monopolies are not strictly 
interchangeable terms. Natural monopolies will always be essential. 
Essential Facilities on some definitions however, need not be natural 
l. 11 monopo 1es . Traditionally, "natural monopoly" has been an economic 
term to describe an activity or industry in which only one entity operates as 
production is most efficiently carried out in this manner.
12 This is as a 
result of the characteristics of the activity or industry, rather than as a result 
of the entity holding any licence or patent. Clearly, this is a cost function. 
A single entity occupies a strategic position and is able to produce at lower 
th l · f · · 13 cost an an a temat1ve group o entitles. 
2.4 In contrast to "natural monopoly" "Essential Facilities" is a legal term, 
though not a term of art. The term is used where facilities cannot be 
practically duplicated by competitors. Such facilities may have developed 
by accident. Historically, the state sector is replete with Essential Facilities 
as a consequence of state infrastructural development and ownership. 
Common examples include electricity grids, telecommunications and rail 
networks, pipelines, ports and airports. Whilst natural monopolies, as 
referred to in the preceding paragraph, arise from competition, clearly 
Essential Facilities on the basis set out in this paragraph do not. 
14 
See, for example, F G Hilmer, Independent Committee of Enquiry into a National Competition Policy 
(AJ Law, Commonwealth Government Printer Canberra 1993) page 240. 
See, Guarantee of Access to Essential Facilities (Ministry of Commerce Discussion Paper, Wellington, 
December 1989) page I. 
See footnote 11, page 2, quoting Schmalensee R, The Control of Natural Monopolies (Lexington 
Books, USA, 1979) page 3. 
See footnote 12. 
That is, "natural monopolies" on this basis are not used interchangeably in this paper with "Essential 
Facilities.". 
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2.5 Essential Facilities give nse to both economic and legal implications. 
David Gerber argues that economically, Essential Facilities are those which 
have the ability to impede any users production or access to a market.
15 
That is, one economic unit is able to impede another. Further, Gerber 
argues all Essential Facilities share four characteristics.
16 First, they are 
unique. Without uniqueness, potential users are able to seek access to a 
competing facility. Secondly, uniqueness must be preserved. The facility 
owner achieves preservation by only selling access to the facility or 
perishable output from the facility. Ownership of the facility itself is 
retained. Thirdly, the facility must be centrally located. Whilst perhaps 
more figurative than literal, unless users are drawn to the facility, 
uniqueness will be irrelevant. Finally, the facility must have the ability to 
impede or facilitate the users business. This concept is described as 
functional control by allowing or impeding access to the facility
17
. 
2.6 Gerber further argues that, legally, a judicial finding that a facility is 
essential is generally dependent upon determining how badly a refusal to 
deal harms both competitors and competition generally. 18
 Simplistically, 
on this basis Gerber suggests "essentiality" has a variable standard because 
"harm" is variable and the courts have not been consistent in their 
application of a definition. 19 
2. 7 The commentary in this section to date is aimed at providing an appropriate 
definition of Essential Facilities in New Zealand so that the further 
arguments in this paper can be developed. Clearly, whilst the concept of 
describing facilities as essential is understandable, in practice there is less 
Gerber DJ, Rethinking the Monopolists Duty to Deal: A Legal and Economic Critique of the Doctrine 
of Essential Facilities ( 1988) 74 Virginia Law Review 1069: 1072 
See footnote 15, pages 1073, 1074 
See footnote 15, pages 1073, 1074 
See footnote 15, page 1075 
See footnote 15, page 1075 
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certainty as to "essential" facilities2°. Complicating factors include the case 
law origins to which reference was made previously. Tye argues no single 
case comprehensively examines Essential Facilities21 . Elsewhere, Areeda 
appears to share similar views, apparently considering Essential Facilities 
have evolved from inconsistent court descriptions of a wide range of 
facilities. 22 . 
2.8 Other impediments to an acceptable definition of Essential Facilities 
include the differing views academics have on the differing characteristics 
of Essential Facilities owners. Some will own the facility only, but leave 
production to others. Yet other owners will own the Essential Facilities but 
compete directly in the same areas or markets as the users of the facility . 
Still other owners may compete but in areas or markets outside of those of 
the users of the facility. Conceptually, should the differing characteristics 
of the owners of Essential Facilities make any difference to the treatment 
and description of Essential Facilities? 
2.9 Daniel Troy argues in the negative23 . Troy argues determination that a 
facility is essential to a particular entity requires consideration of three 
factors. First, can an entity's end product or service be produced or 
marketed without use of the facility or is it necessary so that the entity can 
participate in the relevant market? Secondly, should the entity be expected 
to duplicate the facility? Lastly, is the entity's ability to produce the end 
product or service within the market necessary to the entity's commercial 
existence in that product line? Under the first consideration, do acceptable 
substitute facilities exist, or can the facility be dispensed with? Under the 
second consideration, is duplication of the facility a standard cost of entry 
See footnote 17 
Tye, W.B. Competitive Access, a Comparative Industry Approach to the Essential Facility Doctrine 
(1987) 8 Energy Law Journal 337: 344 
Areeda P, Essential Facilities: An Epithet in Need of Limiting Principles (1990) 58 AntiTrust Law 
Journal 841: 842, 843 - although dealing with the Doctrine, Areeda clearly had difficulties accepting 
the cases quoted dealt with "Essential Facilities", to be able to invoke the Doctrine. 
Troy DE Unclogging the Bottleneck: A New Essential Facility Doctrine (I 983) 83 Columbia Law 
Review 441 :464 
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for the particular market and the line of business in that endeavour and 
locale? Under the third consideration unless the entity was established 
elsewhere, the facility would be essentiai2
4
. 
2.10 Troy believes his definition of Essential Facilities is consistent, whether or 
not the owners of such facilities compete with suppliers or customers. His 
rationale is a refusal to deal or to allow use, has the same economic effect 
whether the Essential Facilities owner competes or not. Further, an anti-
competitive intent is likely to be apparent. Thirdly, by looking at the effects 
of the action any distinction between integrated and non-integrated entities 
. d d . 1 25 1s ren ere 1rre evant . 
2.11 Troy's analysis of Essential Facilities is not supported by Tye. Tye argues 
that whilst economists have analysed vertical foreclosure issues, which, Tye 
says parallel Essential Facilities, no similar analysis has been carried out on 
Essential Facilities.26 Accordingly, economic theory and the law have not 
addressed the same issues in respect of Essential Facilities. Further and 
relevantly for New Zealand, Tye says there are special problems when 
applying the concept of Essential Facilities to regulated industries in the 
course of deregulation. Enforcement of a definition of Essential Facilities 
may conflict with the regulatory goals underlining the deregulation.
27 In 
contrast to Troy too, Tye argues that Troy's three part test2
8 by focussing on 
the effects of an Essential Facilities owners actions may obscure the fact the 
Essential Facility owner is infringing competition, the protection of which 
of course is at the heart of anti-trust legislation. 
2.12 The commentary to date has examined some of the conceptual difficulties 
in defining Essential Facilities. There are extensive other materials which 
See footnote 23 at page 465 
See footnote 23 at page 4 71 
See footnote 21 at page 345 
See footnote 21 at page 345 
See paragraphs 2.9 and 2. 10 of this paper. 
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similarly can be consulted and which similarly illustrate that whilst the 
concept of describing facilities as essential is undoubted, not all 
commentators believe they are describing the same things29. Gerber, Troy, 
Areeda and Tye do not agree whether Essential Facilities are natural 
monopolies or arise from competition, whether the economic or the legal 
implications predominate or whether competing owners should be treated 
differently to non-competing owners. Given the conceptual difficulties 
noted to date to provide a definition of Essential Facilities this section will 
now consider whether case law provides any superior assistance, following 
which this section will conclude by attempting a definition of Essential 
Facilities relevant to New Zealand. 
2.13 As indicated at the outset of this section, the conceptual difficulties in 
defining Essential Facilities are not helped by the alleged unsatisfactory 
logic of the early case law from the United States of America. Again 
extensive materials analysing the classic cases can be found. This paper 
will not reproduce detailed analysis but in accordance with the paper's 
objectives, a summary will assist define Essential Facilities in a 
New Zealand context. 
2.14 The Terminal Railroad Association30 case involved a monopoly facility 
acquired by a group of rail operators. An extensive number of railroads met 
at St Louis and use of Terminal Railroads facility was required. 
Duplication of the facility was not feasible. The court required the rail 
operators to admit non-members to their group so that access to the rail 
facility was made available. The court considered this to be the most 
efficient option available to overcome both exclusion and disadvantage of 
non-members. 
Gerber, Troy, Areeda and Tye are but four examples of academic commentators on this subject. 
United States v Terminal Rail Road Association 224 US 383 (1912) 
WG951420.05 lslpl0v40+ 
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2.15 In the Associated Press3
1 case, a group of newspaper owners created 
Associated Press. Members obtained access to news stories generated 
within the group, as well as generating news stories independently. 
Economies of scale resulted as was desired. New members were admitted 
provided they did not compete with an existing member. The court held 
such an admissions policy breached Section 2 of The Sherman Act although 
the court did not require Associated Press to allow any applicant to join. At 
issue was the ban on members competitors joining the group. Areeda 
argues only one Justice in the case, Frankfurter J, raised any essential 
facility concepts by comparing Associated Press with a public utility and 
requiring it to serve the public.
32 
2.16 Areeda argues that this narrow suggestion now appears to have been 
expanded by later cases to be authority to require access be given to rivals if 
the facility is useful, essential to a rival's competitive position and to the 
market and if admission of rival's is consistent with the legitimate purposes 
of the venture. Areeda does not agree with such a summation
33
. 
Additionally, the influence of Otter Tail Power Co v .United States
34 is 
similarly regarded as ill-founded. 
2.17 In Otter Tail Power Co v United States3
5
, municipalities requested Otter 
Tail either sell electricity wholesale or carry electricity purchased elsewhere 
over Otter Tails lines. Otter Tail refused, wishing to retain the loca~ 
distribution business. The court held Otter Tail to be in breach of the 
monopolisation provisions of Section 2 of the Sherman Act. Otter Tail, 
however, was subject to regulation by the United States Federal Power 
Commission. That agency held statutory obligations to regulate both prices 
Associated Press v United States 326 US 1 ( 1945) 
See footnote 22, page 843 
See footnote 22, page 844 
410 us 366 (1973) 
See footnote 34 
WG951420.051 s Ip 11 v4o+ 
36 
37 
- 12 -
and the terms of access. Otter Tail could have been regulated without resort 
to the Sherman Act. 
2.18 Finally, in Aspen Skiing Co v Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp
36 two ski 
companies offered ski tickets for use on skifields owned by each company. 
Aspen Skiing withdrew from the arrangements and whilst Aspen Highlands 
lost some patronage, it remained viable. Nevertheless, on appeal the court 
held the joint ticket arrangement to be an essential facility . Further, Aspen 
Skiing's intent was to create or maintain a monopoly. The court believed 
the two companys' co-operation to be efficient, whereas by implication, by 
withdrawing from the arrangement was to illustrate an illegitimate business 
purpose. 
2.19 Against the background of the commentary to date it is now necessary to 
determine a definition of Essential Facilities which is relevant to New 
Zealand. This paper should not be criticised for spending some time 
analysing the origins of a definition. It has been necessary to do so, to show 
that whilst Essential Facilities concepts have developed over a significant 
period of time there is still academic and case law disagreement as to the 
ambit of a definition. In these circumstances what is the position in New 
Zealand? Michael Walls recently delivered a paper at a Trade Practices 
Workshop of the Law Council of Australia.
37 Walls said the topic of 
Essential Facilities and how they should be treated under competition law 
has received little attention in recent years in New Zealand. Indeed it is 
only since 1984 and the rapid corporatisation of state owned entities 
thereafter that has begun to focus attention on Essential Facilities. It is 
apparent there will be little New Zealand academic comment to assist define 
Essential Facilities. 
472 us 585 (1985) 
Walls M, Essential Facilities in New Zealand, Another Chapter Begins? The Trade Practices Workshop 
Fremantle, Western Australia 14/16 July 1995. 
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2.20 Under case law, in Auckland Regional Authority v Mutual Rental Cars 
(Auckland Airport) Limited,38 Barker J considered the Essential Facilities 
definition and drew upon United States of America authority for his 
observations. The case arose when the ARA contractually agreed to allow 
the operation of only two car rental services at Auckland Airport but sought 
a declaration as to whether it was able to consider licensing a third operator. 
The third operator argued the ARA was able to negotiate as a refusal would 
be in breach of several provisions of the Act. Unsurprisingly, an existing 
licence holder did not agree. Relevantly, the court held the ARA was in a 
dominant position under Section 36 of the Act and had a monopoly. Only 
the ARA licensed rental car operations at the airport, so that any other rental 
car operation seeking access to the Airport was obliged to deal with the 
ARA. 
2.21 Whilst c1tmg the Terminal Railroad Association39 case, Barker J also 
considered Hecht v Pro Football Jnc4° to be illustrative of several United 
States of America decisions. In that case, a group of promoters sought to 
obtain a professional football league franchise. The promoters brought a 
private anti-trust action against the owners of a rival league. The promoters 
alleged restrictive covenants in a lease of a stadium to which the rival 
league had access, prevented the promoters from similarly using the 
stadium. The promoters claimed an illegal restraint of trade, but moreover 
as the stadium was the only facility suitable for professional football the 
covenants prevented their franchise application proceeding. 
2.22 The court, at Appeals level, determined the existence of a product market, 
that of professional football , but the relevant geographic market was 
disputed. The court agreed with the promoters that the geographic market 
constituted the area of effective competition. In this case, the city 
[I 987] 2 NZLR 647 
See footnote 30 
570 F 2d 982 (I 977) 
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metropolitan area was the geographic market rather than the entire 
country.41 For purposes of this paper, the court considered Essential 
Facilities to be as follows;42 
"To be essential, a facility need not be indispensable it is sufficient 
if duplication of the facility would be economically infeasible and 
if denial of its use inflicts a severe handicap on potential market 
entrants. Necessarily this principle must be carefully delimited. 
The anti-trust laws do not require that an essential facility be 
shared if such sharing would be impractical or would inhibit the 
defendant's ability to serve its customers adequately. " 
The court cited Terminal Railroad Association43 and Otter Taiz44 as 
authority for the origins of Essential Facilities. 
2.23 Barker J adopted that definition 45 , describing it as appropriate in the instant 
case. Notably, however, the judgment made no further detailed attempt to 
explain or to delimit, in the words of Hecht v Pro Football Inc.46, the ambit 
and nature of an Essential Facility. In subsequent years, neither has any 
further New Zealand authority provided any superior assistance. As with 
overseas authorities the concept of an Essential Facility is accepted but the 
parameters of a definition remain murky. Nevertheless this paper argues a 
definition of Essential Facilities relevant to New Zealand can be 
determined .. 
2.24 The Ministry of Commerce has highlighted one aspect of an Essential 
Facilities definition. That is, academic and case law commentary reflect 
that it is not end-consumers who are concerned to define Essential 
See footnote 40 at pages 988-989 
See footnote 40 at pages 992-993 
See footnote 30 
See footnote 34 
See footnote 38 at page 680 
See footnote 40 at pages 992-993 
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Facilities. The concept is one sought by business conswners who similarly 
to the Essential Facilities owner seek to service end-conswners. To be able 
to do to, access to Essential Facilities is required.47 Accordingly, are the 
elements of the Essential Facilities definition as supplied in Hecht v Pro 
Football Inc. 48 and thereafter in Auckland Regional Authority v Mutual 
Rental Cars (Auckland Airport) Limitec/9, appropriate to the New Zealand 
context? 
2.25 Under the United States of America case law, several examples of Essential 
Facilities seem inappropriate to the New Zealand context. For example, are 
railroad connections truly economically infeasible to duplicate? In New 
Zealand until recently there were no private rail networks in any event. 
Similarly news gathering operations? Arguably such a result would be 
untenable today. Further, resort to the Essential Facilities concept in the 
Aspen50 case appears ill founded because in that case a marketing 
arrangement was at issue, not a facility. Facilities have physical or 
mechanical connotations rather than such as products or arrangements. 
Further, the definition itself recognises the Essential Facilities concept must 
be carefully delimited. The Essential Facilities concept demands a narrow 
definition within the New Zealand context. 
2.26 A narrow definition is clearly favoured by the Ministry of Commerce51, 
who argue that in New Zealand only the former state owned network 
facilities are regarded as Essential Facilities. This paper argues that that 
view is consistent with what is appropriate to the New Zealand context. 
Prior to deregulation and privatisation, New Zealand was relatively well 
served by network facilities . This country lacks sufficient population and 
investment however, to economically duplicate network facilities following 
Guarantee of Access to Essential Facilities, Discussion Paper, Ministry of Commerce, Wellington 
December 1989. 
See footnote 40 
See footnote 38 
See footnote 36 
See footnote 4 7 
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deregulation and privatisation even if arguably the new entrants should be 
providing them. There is too, an element of pragmatism in a narrow 
definition of Essential Facilities. Apart from network facilities, there are 
very few facilities which are used to the exclusion of other access seeking 
parties. Sports facilities are rarely individually owned. Service and other 
facilities are still widely available on a regional basis. Practically, New 
Zealand has little need to adopt a wide definition of Essenttal Facilities. 
Restricting the definition of Essential Facilities to former state owned 
network facilities in the New Zealand context provides both economic and 
commercial common sense. 
2.27 This section has taken some time to consider a definition of Essential 
Facilities. In reaching a conclusion, this section is not considered the 
Essential Facilities doctrine but merely a definition of those facilities which 
can be described as essential. The definition of Essential Facilities in New 
Zealand when restricted to former state owned network facilities provides 
consistency with Gerbers four characteristics
52 and Troys three 
characteristics are similarly appropriate
53
. Nevertheless the more extreme 
United States of America case law examples are removed. This paper uses 
the definition of Essential Facilities provided in this section throughout the 
remaining sections. 
See footnote 16 
See footnote 23 
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3. Section 36 of the Commerce Act 1986 
S4 
SS 
S6 
57 
S8 
3.1 This section of the paper analyses Section 36. First, the aims of the Act and 
the constituent parts of Section 36 are noted, following which reference is 
made to statutes from other jurisdictions which have influenced the wording 
of Section 36. Thereafter, a summary of the relevant case law is noted. In 
this way, this section will illustrate the initial political aspirations for 
Section 36. The case law summary will illustrate that whatever the initial 
political aspirations were, in fact Section 36 has been a difficult piece of 
legislation to interpret. This section of the paper concludes that 
consequently the adequacy of Section 36 to guarantee access to Essential 
Facilities has been compromised. 
3.2 The Act is designed to promote competition within markets in New 
Zealand. To do so, the Act seeks to prevent the acquisition
54 and misuse of 
excessive economic power by5
5 entities operating within particular 
markets. 56 For purposes of this paper, the Act prohibits entities which have 
excessive economic power in the markets in which they operate from using 
that power for the purposes of restricting entry to the particular market, or 
for the purposes of preventing or deterring competitive conduct or for 
eliminating an entity from a particular market. 
57 
3.3 The Act then, is an economic tool. The Act is not as a code for all 
competition law matters
58 but where it does apply, the Act has been 
described as light handed regulation. That is, the Act does not contain any 
barriers to competitive activities, but parties in competition with each other 
are expected to regulate their relationships recognising conduct which the 
See Patterson R.H. Competition Issues for Natural Monopolies and Essential Facilities, Utility Markets 
Summit Wellington 27/28 April 1995 page I 
See footnote 54 
See footnote 54 
See the wording of Section 36, as set out in the Appendix 
See for example Section 7 of the Act and see later in this section some limitations on the application of 
Section 36 
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Act proscribes. Owners of Essential Facilities are subject to the Act for 
these reasons. Specifically, Section 36 is integral in determining the 
success of promoting competition within Essential Facilities as defined in 
this paper. 
3.4 Section 36 has constituent parts, each of which interplay and are separately 
and collectively the subject of significant academic and judicial comment. 
Further, interpretation and emphasis of the constituent parts appears to have 
varied since enactment, so that consistency of treatment of Section 36 is not 
always apparent. The section appears in the appendix. In summary, no 
person who has a dominant position in a market, shall use that position for a 
purpose proscribed in Section 36(1)(a), (b) or (c), largely those activities 
referred to in paragraph 3.2 above. "Person" as defined in section 2(1) 
extends to include individuals, associations of entities and need not be a 
separate legal entity. Nevertheless, the allusion to monopolists is 
apparent.59 Section 3(8) and section 3(1A), again appearing in the appendix 
define "dominant position" and "market" respectively. Section 2(5)(b) 
defines "purpose". 
3.5 It is these latter three constituent parts which are important in determining 
the general effectiveness of Section 36. In terms of the general 
characteristics of the section, Section 36 has not been enacted to enable 
traders to challenge the efficacy of the activities of other traders in an 
unrestricted sense. Instead, Section 36 is designed to promote competition 
by prohibiting certain anti competitive conduct. This means the section is 
not designed to control for example the owners of Essential Facilities 
generally, but only in situations where the owners of Essential Facilities act 
in a dominant position in a market for which they display anti-competitive 
purposes. Vigorous competition is permitted, indeed promoted, until the 
anti-competitive threshold is crossed. 
See the words "any association of persons whether incorporated or not" 
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3.6 Section 36 is based on Section 2 of the Sherman Act in the United States of 
America, Article 86 of the Treaty of Rome and Section 46 of the Australian 
Trade Practices Act 1974.60 Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, it is an 
offence to monopolise or attempt to monopolise any part of the trade or 
commerce among states or with foreign nations. Article 86 of the Treaty of 
Rome prohibits abuse of a dominant position within the Common Market. 
Examples of abuse include directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase 
or selling prices or other unfair trading conditions. Under Section 46 of the 
Australian Trade Practices Act 1974, it is an offence to take advantage of a 
substantial degree of market power in a market for purposes of eliminating 
or substantially damaging a competitor or preventing entry to a market. 
Inferences can be drawn from conduct in this regard.
61 
3. 7 Whilst Section 36 contrasts with the words of Section 2 of the Sherman 
Act, the similarities with both Article 86 of the Treaty of Rome and Section 
46 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 are more pronounced. Section 36 is a 
self help regulation to which disgruntled parties have resort. Nevertheless, 
any alleged offender under the section is not required to positively carry out 
any particular activities, but merely to cease carrying out any anti-
competitive behaviour. In this regard, Section 36 is limited in application. 
The section does not address the regulation of competition in the widest 
sense. Where Essential Facilities are concerned, there are doubts, for 
example, that Section 36 applies in every instance where any alleged 
offender does not compete with the intended user, such as an airport 
company and an airline. Whilst each interacts, neither competes in the 
same market.62 Yet a Section 36 action arose in Auckland Regional 
Authority v Mutual Rental Cars (Auckland Airport) Limitec/'3 where the 
Airport and Rental Car companies were not in the same market. 
See footnote 54 pages 4 and 5 
All such provisions are set out in the Appendix 
See Air New Zealand Limited v Wellington International Airport Company Limited, CP 829/92 and CP 
13/93 Wellington Registry 15 October 1993 
See footnote 38 
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3.8 Section 36 is not unique merely by providing interpretational difficulties. 
Nevertheless, such difficulties do affect the ability of Section 36 to 
guarantee access to Essential Facilities. The section may be of limited 
application
64 and may not apply where parties are incapable of acting 
anti-competitively against each other.
65 On the definition of Essential 
Facilities in New Zealand, that of former state owned network facilities 
undergoing deregulation and privatisation, whilst theoretically competition 
is available, this paper argues in practice the competitive environment will 
be compromised if there are doubts the legislative guarantor of access to 
Essential Facilities always applies. 
3.9 In summary, some conceptual issues arise. The introduction of competition 
to Essential Facilities in New Zealand has created some difficulties. 
Structurally, at least initially, deregulation and privatisation have not always 
produced streamlined or efficient entities. 
66 Privatisation has resulted in 
non-traditional parties seeking access to Essential Facilities. Combined 
with these characteristics, the political aspirations for Section 36 were 
always bold. This paper argues that the economic basis to Section 36 has 
been difficult for the business community and the judiciary to assimilate to 
practically promote competition. Characteristically, competition exists in 
markets which on authority do not exist in neat clearly delineated sections. 
Markets overlap and otherwise boundaries become blurred. Geographic 
markets also exist and interact. 
67 These are difficult concepts and this paper 
accepts New Zealand inevitably will have difficulty in achieving immediate 
success. Indeed Michael Walls suggests New Zealand is a specialist 
laboratory for the theories of prominent economists from the United States 
of America, and elsewhere.
68 Nevertheless, an assessment of whether 
See paragraph 3. 7 
The wording of Section 36 proscribes anti-competitive behaviour 
This is a theme which will be developed in section 5 of this paper 
See Queensland Wire Industries Pty Limited v The Broken Hill Pty Company Limited
 ( 1989) 167 CLR 
177: 196 
See footnote 3 7 page I 
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Section 36 remains appropriate to guarantee access to Essential Facilities 
needs to be constantly reviewed. 
3.10 Whilst there is no universally accepted method of regulating mark
ets and 
competition generally, New Zealand, along with Australia focuses on a 
purpose based approach in Section 36, to ascertain, for example, the reasons 
for an Essential Facility owner's actions. The purpose based intent of the 
section is limiting and not conducive to positively promoting competition. 
Adding confusion is that whilst legislation as provided under Section 36 is 
usually interpreted in terms of its ordinary meaning, clearly the political 
aspirations were for economic considerations of "efficiency".
69 Legal 
practice and economic aspirations need to be reconciled. 
3.11 Chicago school economists seek efficiency per se. The Act similarly
 seeks 
to encourage the efficient use of resources. Yet, efficiency and competition 
do not coincide. In purely efficient terms, a single operator of a facility 
may be desirable, but at the expense of competition. Under the Act, rivalry 
is sought as the promoter of the efficient use of resources. On this basis a 
literal interpretation can not be given to Section 36, the section being part of 
an economic tool. Economic requirements mean the section needs to be 
considered in a broader more sophisticated sense. Such a requirement 
presents difficulties for usual legal practice in the sense that the mix of 
diverse economic and legal disciplines can frustrate a practical result in ar,j 
particular instance. 
3.12 This section of the paper to date has illustrated first the constituent p
arts of 
Section 36 but also the political aspirations that the section perform any 
economic role. This section has also illustrated some doubts Section 36 
will always be appropriate and that the economic basis of the section is 
understood. Yet, Section 36 seeks to protect competition itself, not 
individual competitors and this suggests the section should be interpreted 
See footnote 47 in the Foreword 
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on economic principles and not on justice to individual parties. 
70 This 
section then, will now consider how Section 36 in fact, has been treated 
judicially in support of its conclusion that Section 36 has been 
compromised. There have been a significant number of cases. This paper 
will not analyse previous decisions in detail. Instead with the decision in 
The Commerce Commission v Port Nelson Limited
71 the latest 
pronouncement is available. It is sensible to consider this decision in 
summary of a number of decisions involving Section 36 as the judgment 
makes some sense of earlier seemingly irreconcilable approaches. The 
changing influences of interpretation of Section 36 are illustrated. 
3.13 The Commerce Commission issued proceedings against Port Nelson 
Limited, under a number of headings. Difficulties had arisen between the 
Port and an independent pilotage company. That company sought to 
compete with the Port in providing pilot services. The Port fixed various 
charges offering discounts on combined services and low charges for 
pilotage. Further, the Port had refused to hire tugs to vessels unless its 
pilots were engaged. It was alleged, the Port's actions collectively breached 
Section 36 amongst other provisions of the Act. It should be noted, these 
proceedings did not involve allegations of denial of access to Essential 
Facilities, but of offences under Section 36. It is for purposes of 
interpreting Section 36 that the decision is discussed. 
3.14 The Court considered the component parts of Section 36 by considering the 
definition of the relevant "market" . 
72 As alluded to earlier in this section, 
73 
the Court held a market to be a loose generality, a field of buyers and sellers 
of goods and services, amongst whom there can be substitution. A market 
has time dimensions and functional level and product and geographic 
Land J. Monopolisation : The Practical Implications of Section 36 of The Commerce Act 1986 (
1988) 
18 VUWLR 51 : 52 
CP No 12/92 Nelson Registry 2 June 1995 
See footnote 71 page 3 7 
See paragraph 3.9 and footnote 67 
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dimensions. Markets are objective facts which exist. 
74 A market is not a 
discrete concept where trading activities can be slotted in, but they overlap 
and there must be potential for competition even in the absence of actual 
competition at the time. 75 . 
sectors of larger markets. 76 
Similarly, there are sub-markets or parts or 
3.15 In the instant case of course, the Commerce Comm_ission was required to 
identify whether on the facts markets existed. The Commerce Commission 
alleged various "markets" existed, including port services, tug services and 
pilotage services to which the court agreed. Next, the court considered a 
definition of dominance, but considered too, whether an economic or legal 
interpretation of dominance was required. 
77 The court identified dominance 
in Section 36 was drawn from Article 86 of the Treaty of Rome and stated 
the European interpretation of dominance, has been an economic, as 
opposed to a dictionary meaning. 
78 As authority for this proposition Re 
Continental Can Co lnc.
79 was cited. Particularly,
80 
undertakings are in a dominant position when they have the power 
to behave independently, which puts them in a position to act 
without taking into account their competitors, purchasers or 
suppliers. 
Such a position may result from market share, or such share combined with 
technical knowledge, raw materials or capital. They have the power to 
control production or determine prices.
81 As can be seen, this is similar 
language to the now enacted Section 3(8) of the Act.
82 
See footnote 71 page 37 
See footnote 71 page 37 
See footnote 71 page 37 
See footnote 71 pages 39-40 
See footnote 71 page 40 
(I 972) CMLR D 11 
See footnote 79 at paragraph 3 
See footnote 80 
See Appendix 
lA~·t LIBR .~Y 
WG95 l 420.05 Is I p23v40+ VICTO:llA Ui-llvEF1dlTY OF \'..'ELUN(HOU 
83 
- 24 -
3.16 The court, at this point continuing its review of the case law to date to trace 
the development of judicial interpretation of Section 36, noted 
Parliamentary debates referred to Re Continental Can Co Jnc
83 at the time 
of the enactment of Section 36. Several earlier New Zealand decisions 
similarly drew upon that authority.
84 The Commerce Commission is noted 
as consistently favouring an economic interpretation of dominance under 
Section 36. The court noted however, a varying standard as to dominance, 
variously "acting without regard to competitors", or "having a commanding 
influence on", both being a high standard.
85 In Re Magnum Corp Limited v 
Dominion Breweries Limited, 
86 the Commerce Commission says the court, 
noted dominance as possessing sufficient market power ( economic strength) 
to enable the dominant party to behave to an appreciable extent in a 
discretionary manner without suffering detrimental effects.
87 Subsequently, 
the court says, the Commission then applied a new standard, based on 
dominance being a measure of market power, stressing largely 
independence of behaviour and an ability to effect changes in price and 
other terms without suffering adversely.
88 
3.17 The court also noted a retreat on the Commission's part from a point of 
economic interpretation of a high standard of dominance to a lesser 
requirement. In Re Broadcast Communications Limite~
9 and Re Carter 
Holt Harvey Limitecf
0 appreciable or "discernible extent" became the 
Commerce Commissions measure. Of more significance, however, and as 
noted next by the court was the decision in Telecom Corporation of New 
Zealand v Commerce Commission
91
• In this decision three of four cellular 
See footnote 79 
See footnote 71 page 41 
See footnote 71 page 41 
(1987) 1 NZBLC (Com) 99-504 see footnote 71 page 41 
See footnote 71 page 41 
See footnote 71 page 43 
(1990) 2 NZBLC (Com) 99-526 see footnote 71 page 43 
(1990) 2 NZBLC (Com) 99-527 see footnote 71 page 43 
[ 1992] 3 NZLR 429 
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frequencies were tendered. Telecom was the highest bidder and became 
entitled to frequency AMPS-A subject to Commerce Commission 
clearance. Clearance was refused although Telecom's purchase of another 
frequency was approved. Telecom offered to give up that other frequency if 
it could retain AMPS-A, but also challenged the lack of clearance. The 
High Court upheld the Commerce Commission's decision but the Court of 
Appeal thereafter, did not. The issues were whether Telecom was in a 
dominant position without having AMPS-A and further would having 
AMPS-A strengthen Telecom's dominant position. The case turned on the 
definition of dominant position. 
3.18 The Court of Appeal in the case
92 held dominance was not argued as being 
used in Section 36 in any particular technical sense, and should be given its 
ordinary meaning. Dominance was based on the degree of control a person 
had over the market involving his or her goods or services. Undertakings 
were in a dominant position when they have the power to behave 
independently, that is without taking into account their competitors' 
purchasers or suppliers. Dominance was not absolute but had to be strong 
enough to ensure an overall independence of behaviour. This involved a 
qualitative assessment of the degree of market power. 
93 
3.19 The conclusion, the court noted in The Commerce Commission v Port 
Nelson Limitecf4 was the demise of econom=-; based standards of 
dominance. Particularly, in Telecom Corporation of New Zealand Limited 
v The Commerce Commission
95 the Court of Appeal drew on Australian 
precedent to indicate common economic usage was subordinate to ordinary 
sense.96 This position has been strongly attacked by Ross Patterson and to a 
See footnote 71 page 44 
See footnote 71 and summary of these points, pages 44-45 
See footnote 71 
See footnote 91 
See footnote 71 page 45 
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lesser extent by Jim Farmer.
97 For precedent purposes, however, legal 
interpretation of dominance now prevails over economic interpretation. 
98 
3.20 The court next considered further limbs of Section 3(8), particularly, the 
tests for the presence of dominance. The Re Continental Can Co Jnc9
9 
origins are noted, however the court considered those origins alone were not 
determinative. Indeed, the court highlights significant factors from the Re 
News Limited/lNL100 decision, such as market structure, and the extent of 
acts of others to be important
101
. 
3.21 The court next considered "use" of such a dominant position, noting the 
presence of a dominant position in itself is not a difficulty but only becomes 
so if the dominant position is used. Drawing directly from precedent of the 
Privy Council in Telecom Corporation of New Zealand Limited v Clear 
Communications Limited, 
102 the court noted that use of a dominant position 
does not result if the party acts the same as another who is not in a dominant 
position but otherwise in the same circumstances would have acted. 
3.22 Purpose remams a vital constituent element. Subjective and objective 
interpretations of purpose have vacillated as being significant. In this 
regard Auckland Regional Authority v Mutual Rental Cars (Auckland 
Airport) Limited1°
3 for example, favours an objective interpretation whilst 
New Zealand Magic Millions Limited v Wrightsons Bloodstock Limitei
0
" 
for example, indicates a subjective approach. The Court was faced with 
seeming inconsistency, but was reluctant to accept entirely a subjective 
See Respectively Patterson R.H. The Rise and Fall of a Dominant Position in New Zealands 
Competition Law, From Economic Concept to Latin Derivation (1993) 15 NZULR 265 and Farmer 
J.A. Deregulation and Competition: Is the Commerce Act Working? (1993) NZ Recent Law Review 14 
: 18-20 
See footnote 71 page 49 
See footnote 79 
(I 987) 1 NZBLC (COM) 99-500. See footnote 71 page 4 I 
See footnote 71 pages 49-50 
See footnote 8 and footnote 7 I pages 5 I and 52 
See footnote 38 
[1990] 1 NZLR 731 
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approach should prevail. Rather than provide, dogmatically, for either 
approach to purpose, it is clear the courts believe objective purpose can be 
discerned from subjective acts. Examples given include inferences from 
acts of participants and subjectively revealing their purpose from 
d d . ·1 . l 105 memoran a an s1m1 ar matena s. Australia appears to favour a 
subjective approach but again contrary precedent can be discemed.
106 
3.23 Section 36 is regarded as a technical section and is widely drafted. 
Nevertheless the section requires certainty of interpretation if it is to be 
effective to assist regulate access to Essential Facilities. This section has 
considered the constituent parts of Section 36. Further, this section has 
considered the political aspirations for Section 36. Finally, the case law 
interpretation has also been considered. This paper argues, on the latest 
judgments, the judicial interpretation is diverging from the political 
aspirations to create uncertainty and thereby compromises the ability of 
Section 36 to perform its envisaged role. This paper also argues the 
divergence of political aspirations for and judicial interpretation of Section 
36 are likely to become more pronounced as precedent firms from Appellate 
Courts. 
See footnote 71 pages 25-29 and the cases noted 
See footnote 7 I pages 25-29 and the cases noted 
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4. The Access Issues 
107 
108 
109 
4.1 This paper asks whether Section 36 is adequate to guarantee access to 
Essential Facilities. To this point Essential Facilities have been defined.
107 
Similarly, this paper has considered aspects of Section 36. To answer the 
question this paper poses however, now requires access issues be examined. 
This paper argues access issues have received far less consideration than 
either of Essential Facilities or Section 36. Yet access is a key concept. 
Access is sought to overcome the economic infeasibility of duplicating 
Essential Facilities. This section argues that the requirements to first, 
penalise denial of access and secondly facilitate access with appropriate 
pricing mechanisms include both certainty and uniformity of treatment. 
This section examines issues of denial of access and of pricing of access 
and concludes both certainty and uniformity in treatment of access issues 
are integral to "efficiency" in providing access to Essential Facilities. 
4.2 To offend under Section 36, a person must use a dominant position in a 
market for the proscribed purposes, or at least one of them. If this does not 
occur or if the parties do not compete, then no offence is disclosed. As has 
been illustrated, however, an Essential Facilities owner will often compete 
directly with other parties or indirectly either up or downstream from the 
markets in which they themselves operate.
108 Accordingly the Essential 
Facilities owner may transgress Section 36 if dominance for a proscribed 
purpose is made out. Predominantly, difficulties will arise in two areas, 
first in denial of access to Essential Facilities and secondly in pricing of 
access to Essential Facilities. 
4.3 Successive governments have relied on Section 36, to guarantee access to 
Essential Facilities. 109
 A guarantee of access implies a positive action, yet 
as has been illustrated, Section 36 does not require any alleged offender to 
Remembering "Essential Facilities" and not the Essential Facilities doctrine has been the focus 
See for example, Telecom and Clear compete directly, Airport Companies and Airlines compete 
indirectly 
See footnote 11 
WG95 i 420.05 Is I p28v40+ 
I 10 
II I 
112 
- 29 -
take any positive steps, merely the section prohibits certain anti-competitive 
conduct. If Section 36 is prohibitive rather than facilitative, then how are 
denial of access and pricing of access issues resolved? It is the absence of 
facilitative mechanisms in Section 36 that persuade this paper to argue the 
access issues are clearly a key concept to address. 
4.4 It is instructive first to consider some conceptual aspects of access. The 
Ministry of Commerce has made it clear they consider access to Essential 
Facilities should be guaranteed. II 
O In December 1989 the Ministry 
confirmed its position in a further paper.
111 But consider however, the basis 
of guaranteeing access. It has been argued by Areeda that to accept a 
premise of guaranteed access to Essential Facilities is to argue a facility is 
essential and then be guaranteed access. That is, rather than consider a 
logical basis upon which access issues should be resolved by emphasising 
the character of the desired facility as essential, access could not be 
refused. 112 
4.5 Such a step would be open to criticism and, it is submitted, correctly. Such 
a step would be inconsistent with aims of efficiency. Further, on such a 
basis, arguments of sufficiency of access arise, which similarly impact on 
efficiency. To declare a facility essential thereby guaranteeing access, may 
open up access to any third party irrespective of the viability of the access 
seeker. Is this the intent of guaranteeing access? Should there be, instead, a 
threshold to achieve before allowing access to be pursued by any access 
seeker? Such a requirement may amount to a self regulatory mechanism if 
a certain level of financial clout or particular skill levels were required, or if 
specific technological skills or competence need to be displayed. Clearly a 
weeding out process occurs if informally anyway. For example Clear 
Communications Limited as a new entrant has demonstrated the financial 
Guarantee of Access to Essential Facilities, Discussion Paper, Ministry of Commerce Wellington, 
August 1989 
See footnote 11 
See footnote 22 
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ability to continue to seek access to Telecom's network facilities as well as 
technical competence. Arguably this need not always be so if access flowed 
merely from defining a facility as essential. 
4.6 Further, it may be sufficient to satisfy access requirements to an Essential 
Facility even though access is not exercised by those able to do so. 
However, should theoretical access be available, but the Essential Facilities 
owner be secure in the knowledge access will never be exercised because 
access seekers lacks the ability to do so? It surely cannot be efficient to 
allow access, but not realistically enable that access to be exercised. Under 
the Act, competition must be workable competition. 
113 This paper argues 
access, similarly, must be workable access, failing which to be required to 
provide access is unrealistic. 
4. 7 Tye describes the process as competitive access.
114 Competitive access 
illustrates access to an Essential Facility cannot be separated from pricing 
the access or setting the terms of access. Only by dealing with these issues 
will it be apparent whether the desire to provide access will be realistic or 
not. As is indicated, if terms of access are nevertheless imposed, the access 
seeker may still not be able to take advantage of that position if the terms 
are unworkable. Workable access cannot be achieved, whether because the 
return is inadequate or for other reasons, such as lack of acumen or ability 
to serve a market. 
115 
4.8 Accordingly, access must be determined on its own terms, and not simply 
by deeming a facility as essential. On this basis however, the issue arises as 
to whether an Essential Facilities owner can ever be obliged to allow access 
to an Essential Facility. Tye has some particular views relevant to the New 
Zealand context where former state owned network facilities are and have 
The Act, section 3( I) 
See footnote 21 
See footnote 21 page 341 
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been undergoing deregulation and privatisation. His views can be 
considered against a review of denial of access matters.
116 
4.9 Denial of access to Essential Facilities may occur directly. Alternatively, 
denial of access may occur constructively. Such steps generally have 
strategic motivations whereby access is denied, for example, to delay or 
deter ultimate access or specifically to prevent access. In contrast to a 
direct refusal to provide access to an Essential Facility an owner may seek 
to disadvantage competitors. Access might be offered but only on 
uneconomic or impractical terms. Such steps would include requiring any 
access seeker to comply with higher technical standards than the Essential 
Facility owner. As a corollary, the access seeker could be required to 
constantly upgrade its technology so as to keep apace of the Essential 
Facilities owner's economies of scale. 
117 
4.10 Further, an Essential Facilities owner could simply impose lengthy delays 
in access, require significant rentals or implement predatory strategies by 
maintaining low charges for access in competitive areas but recover 
elsewhere in areas in which a monopoly existed. Such strategies enable a 
maximising of profit even if this requires any intended users of the Essential 
Facility pass on the higher charges.
118 
4.11 The changing nature in structure and ownership of Essential Facilities i11 
New Zealand and the first time exposure of Essential Facilities to 
competition has also impacted on access issues. Whilst more in the nature 
of a constructive denial of access, Tye says it is recognised that deregulation 
of previously strictly controlled industries does not immediately allow 
effective competition nor access to Essential Facilities.
119 Economies of 
scale and short term barriers to entry remain during an initial period. In 
See footnote 21 page 338 
See footnote I I pages 19-20 
See footnote 11 pages 19-20 
See footnote 21 page 338 
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response, Tye argues competitive access is achieved by enabling at least 
initially virtually all access seekers access to the Essential Facility. Further, 
as some parties in the competitive loop would be eliminated over a period 
of time, ultimate deregulation will still occur.
120 
4.12 Whilst this paper is sympathetic to Tye's competitive access proposals, 
immediate inconsistencies are apparent. In which circumstances and to 
which regulated or deregulated entities should access be allowed to 
Essential Facilities? Further, such steps are inconsistent with the intention 
to have Section 36 determine access issues in respect of Essential Facilities 
without legislative or regulatory barriers. As reliance upon competition is 
sought, this paper argues a piecemeal retention of regulatory access systems 
which Tye favours will create uncertainty and confusion. Further, Tye's 
rationale for competitive access systems by regulation in an initial stage is 
unhelpful. Tye's concern appears to be that limitations on competition at 
one place in a market undergoing deregulation must not impact on 
. . h . . 1 1 121 compet1t10n at ot er compet1t1ve eve s. Yet under Tye's proposals, 
uncertainty is likely as to whom would obtain protective access whilst 
undergoing deregulation and upon what terms, which may be inefficient or 
uneconomic. This paper argues either a regulatory regime is applied 
universally or the prevailing alternative is applied 
4.13 This paper also argues that the foregoing arguments of allowing competitive 
access are inconsistent with matters of pricing of access to Essential 
Facilities. The structural and ownership changes in Essential Facilities are 
an issue. As Tye
122 says, through deregulation and privatisation the former 
objectives of Essential Facilities are now redundant. This is true. Essential 
Facilities are required to be commercially competitive. The former political 
or social activities of such entities such as supporting regional development 
See footnote 21 page 338 
See footnote 2 I page 34 I 
See footnote 2 I page 344 
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and subsidisation now play no part. Further, former involvement in policy 
making and other non competitive activities have ceased, but structural 
"flab" remains. Light handed legislation was envisaged to provide a 
framework in which participants could negotiate and determine all pricing 
of access issues. In the absence of alternative suppliers of Essential 
Facilities, results have not been spectacular, but too, a lack of skill expertise 
and experience and an unfamiliarity with the practicalities of Section 36 
have not helped. It is difficult to see Tye's piecemeal regulatory approach 
facilitating satisfactory pricing mechanisms. 
123 
4.14 A further complicating factor in pricing of access to Essential Facilities 
concerns again the variety of attributes of the owners of Essential Facilities. 
First, the owner may compete with an intended user on a direct basis in the 
same market. Telecom and Clear and their use of telecommunications 
networks are obvious examples. In such a case the Essential Facilities 
owner not only owns the facility but uses it as well. Secondly, the owner 
may provide the Facility only but not directly compete with the intended 
user. An airport company offering the network facility (airport) to airlines 
is an obvious example. Presently, in the former case, any party seeking to 
price access to an Essential Facility will have recourse to Section 36 as an 
option to control an uncooperative Essential Facilities owner. In the latter 
case, Section 36 recourse will not usually be available.
124 Does its make 
sense from an access standpoint that a mechanism for pricing of access 
might be determined by the identity of the parties and not by certain and 
uniform procedures? 
4.15 This section of the paper has sought to raise access issues to a key concept 
level. Yet there are clear deficiencies with a lack certainty and uniformity 
of procedures for access. Under Section 36, as guarantor of access to 
Essential Facilities, an offender need not take any positive steps to facilitate 
That is, if Tye proceeds on a case by case basis, certainty and uniformity of treatment are unlikely. 
See cases at footnote 8 and footnote 62 respectively 
WG95 l 420.05 Is I p33v4o+ 
125 
126 
127 
128 
- 34 -
access. Section 36 does not address sufficiency of access.
125 Denial of 
Access can take on many forms
126
. Conceptually, pricing of access at 
present, falls to be determined depending on the characteristics of the owner 
of the Essential Facility. This has been illustrated by the Privy Council 
decision in Telecom Corporation of New Zealand Limited v Clear 
C . . r · . d 121 ommumcatzons zmzte . 
4.16 Clear issued proceedings to obtain injunctive relief of a mandatory nature 
requiring Telecom to provide access to its telecommunications network in 
Wellington. Whilst Clear intended to construct a network in central 
business districts, Telecom's network was required for the larger local 
calling area. This was so that access was available in the local area for 
Clear subscribers. The price issue was crucial. What should Clear pay for 
access to Telecom's network? Arnold
128 argues, economically, three 
principles are relevant. First, access and usage should be charged 
separately. Access enables calls to be made by use of the network which is 
in place. Costs are incurred whether calls are made or not. Additional costs 
then arise as calls are actually made. These are usage costs. Secondly, 
price must recover incremental costs, not just marginal costs. Marginal cost 
recovery meets the costs of producing the next unit of production. In the 
telecommunications industry, if working to capacity the next increment of 
production will be particularly high as a new or further capacity must be 
created. Incremental costs ~ase recovery of such demand, the future costs. 
Thirdly, common costs are recovered. Essentially these include mark up, 
whereby a recovery is made over and above simply averaged out costs. 
Arnold says, these are sometimes called fair and reasonable costs, but such 
a description is not helpful. 
See paragraphs 4.5 and 4.6 
See paragraphs 4.9 and 4. JO 
See footnote 8 
Arnold T. The Courts, the Commerce Act and Pricing of Access to Essential Facil ities, Law and 
Economics Association of New Zealand, Wellington 5 December 1994 pages 8-10 
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4.17 Telecom advanced what is now the Baumol/Willig rule, named after 
American economists who suggested it. Essentially Telecom could charge 
Clear a price equivalent to the difference between the price Telecom 
received from a CBD subscriber for providing the telecommunication link 
and the average incremental cost which Telecom saved by not having to 
provide a link since the subscriber was with Clear. In short, in a fully 
contestable market, someone selling to a competitor 1:he facilities necessary 
to provide a service that the seller could otherwise provide would demand a 
price equal to the revenues they would have obtained if actually providing 
th · 129 e service. 
4.18 Baumol and Willig called the rule the efficient component pricing rule. The 
Privy Council claimed the rule allowed the recovery of the opportunity cost 
of the owner as in a contestable market the owner would not give up access 
at a cost lower than the owner would otherwise have achieved for providing 
access itself. Accordingly the Privy Council said use of this pricing 
structure could not be use of a dominant position for anti-competitive 
purposes. Further, on the advice of a further economist
130 Telecom would 
not be acting anti-competitively if its actions required Clear to succeed 
l 1 · ffi · 131 so e yon its own e 1c1ency. 
4.19 The High Court was of the view that any monopoly profits in the rule 
would be competed away if Clear were able to be more efficient than 
Telecom. 1
32 Thus competition was enhanced. The Court of Appeal did not 
agree regarding Monopoly rents. It held passing such rents on, did breach 
Section 36 in being anti-competitive. 
133 The Privy Council however held 
the Court of Appeal was not entitled to overturn the monopoly rents 
position. Further, the Privy Council said Clear had not demonstrated it 
See footnote 8 at pages 405 and 406 
American economist Dr Kahn, see footnote 8 page 398 also described as Professor Kahn 
See footnote 8 at page 407 - Dr Kahn's comparative parity, see page 396 
See footnote 8 page 407 
See footnote 8 page 407 
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could not compete if the rule applied. Additionally, the Act provided for 
. 1 1 h 134 pnce contro e sew ere. 
4.20 The Privy Council's use of the Baumol/Willig rule has been attacked as 
simplistic, legalistic and plainly wrong. 
135 But for pricing of access issues 
what does the decision mean and did Section 36 play any role in 
determining the pricing of access? It is argued Section 36 was relevant only 
to determine in the Court's eyes that there was no use of a dominant 
position for a proscribed purpose in the steps taken by Telecom. It is 
further argued however, that clearly determining the pricing of access was 
never a function Section 36 was designed to do. In short, provided Section 
36 was not breached, the pricing of access could be determined on a basis to 
which the parties could ultimately agree. All the Privy Council was saying 
was there is recognition Clear and Telecom do not agree but nevertheless 
Section 36 has not been breached and Telecom's use of the Baumol/Willig 
rule in this instance was acceptable.
136 Accordingly, there is recognition 
that the Baumol/Willig rule may not be an appropriate measure for all 
occasions but the fact of its use meant that there is now a narrow role for 
Section 36 to play in detennining both use and purpose. 
137 
4.21 This paper treats access as a key concept. To promote competition and to 
overcome the economic infeasibility of duplicating Essential Facilities, 
access must be granted. This paper accepts however access can never b1., 
granted, or priced consistently in all cases. Nevertheless, access can be 
given certainty and uniformity procedurally. Section 36 does not provide a 
procedural regime and as a consequence "efficiency" is unlikely to follow. 
This theme is examined in the next section of this paper. 
See footnote 8 at page 408 
See for example, Van Roy Y, The Privy Council Decision in Telecom v Clear: Narrowing the 
Application of section 36 of the Commerce Act 1986 ( I 995) NZLJ 54. 
See footnote 8 at page 408 
See footnote 13 5 at page 60 
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III MEASURING THE SUCCESS 
5. The Adequacy of Section 36 
138 
139 
5.1 To date, this paper has defined Essential Facilities in New Zealand. 
Secondly, issues regarding Section 36 have been identified. Thirdly, this 
paper has sought to raise the importance of access issues. It is now 
necessary to discuss the practical implications of the arguments and to draw 
the various sections together to answer the question posed by this paper. As 
a general statement, it is axiomatic that there will be competing views as to 
whether Section 36 is adequate to guarantee access to Essential Facilities. 
Some argue Section 36 is not sufficiently explicit to require or cajole access 
be made available to an Essential Facility. Further, the burden of proving a 
party acted with anti-competitive intent is very difficult. The converse 
argument is that Section 36 is expressed in broad terms so that general 
principles are available and more explicit regulatory procedures are not 
necessary.
138 
5.2 This paper argues however, that "access" is a key concept. Whilst, 
Essential Facilities and Section 36 each have their own peculiarities and 
must be individually analysed, to confirm the adequacy of Section 36 to 
guarantee access to Essential Facilities requires that "access" be adequately 
treated. As argued in Section 4 of this paper, access demands certainty and 
uniformity of action and response, but is this achieved by Section 36. 
5.3 Essential Facilities were formerly state network facilities performing state 
functions for the collective good. Subsequently these have been structurally 
ineptly deregulated and privatised.
139 They now perform functions for 
individual owners who have, perhaps, quite unfairly retained the network 
facilities which were formerly state (collectively) owned. Should not this 
See footnote 11 
Particularly in the early days of deregulation. See too, the Health Refonns of 1993, where en
tities 
were protected in their initial stages. 
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situation have been specifically addressed? Can Section 36 be effective in 
such circumstances? The section is charged with performing a facilitative 
role, yet the section is not a facilitative provision. Section 36 proscribes 
certain anti-competitive behaviour.
14° Can it be seriously argued access is 
facilitated both sufficiently and adequately in such circumstances, where a 
new entity has acquired ownership of arguably facilities which should never 
have been given away? 
5.4 Against this background, this section argues there are a number of 
commonly accepted limitations as to the adequacy of Section 36 to 
guarantee access to Essential Facilities. These will be discussed, leading to 
the conclusion Section 36 is of limited adequacy for its intended role. 
Pre-eminently, for whose benefit does Section 36 exist? Section 36 does 
not exist to allow traders on an unrestricted basis to challenge other traders 
generally. Section 36 is only available where parties compete so that 
coverage under the section is limited. Yet unless coverage can be sustained, 
some disgruntled parties are seemingly without access to the Act's 
predominant remedy for access difficulties. Further, as has previously been 
noted, once coverage is available, any party acting in contravention of the 
section is not obliged to act in any way positively, but merely to desist 
. . . . 1 141 actmg ant1-compet1t1ve y. 
5.5 These points illustrate the difficulties inherent in relying upon Section 36 to 
guarantee access to Essential Facilities. The very nature of the task Section 
36 is asked to perform but fails to perform can be summarised concisely. 
That is, the section is asked to perform a facilitative purpose but is not 
expressed in language appropriate to that purpose. Accordingly, it is argued 
Section 36 fails, simply because the task asked of it is inappropriate. 
See Section 36 in Appendix 
See paragraph 3. 7 
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5.6 Essential Facilities owners are in a privileged position. In addition to 
owning the Essential Facility, the knowledge inherent in ownership is also 
within the province of the Essential Facility owner. To compete efficiently, 
any party must have the same level of knowledge as the Essential Facility 
owner. Without an equal knowledge, an access seeker is disadvantaged. 
This disadvantage is manifested in an inability to determine the correct 
technology to adopt or to put in place correct pricing principles for the 
output of the Essential Facility. Telecom Corporation of New Zealand 
Limited v Clear Communications Limite<l
42 litigation clearly illustrates the 
imbalance of knowledge in pricing principles. Section 36 does not facilitate 
disclosure of requisite information. Not only is disclosure of information 
not facilitated, but neither does the section require any timely activities by 
an Essential Facilities owner. Note however, this is not to say Section 36 is 
deficient for not promoting a timely disclosure of relevant information, but 
simply that it is a task inappropriate to the provisions of Section 36. 
5. 7 A corollary to these characteristics of Section 36, is what is termed the 
"transactional" costs implications arising from the requirements of Section 
36 to perform inappropriate tasks. As an illustration, as an Essential 
Facilities owner is subject to Section 36 only in a limited range of activities, 
a party alleging a breach of Section 36 is placed in the position of 
expending significant costs on the chance a breach of Section 36 will be 
made out. Such costs include representation in litigation, including the 
discovery process, engaging expert witnesses and counsel and engaging 
associated personnel and time costs. A consequence of the process is total 
uncertainty. Further, any favourable result does not resolve the process, but 
merely requires the competing parties to continue to negotiate a solution. 
143 
5.8 The preceding paragraphs merely illustrate previously disclosed 
deficiencies of Section 36 in regulating the access process to Essential 
See footnote 8 
See footnote 54 page 5 
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Facilities. It may be unfair to regard Section 36 as inadequate for its stated 
purposes if only because exception can be taken with the proscriptive rather 
than facilitative nature of this section. An appropriate response to 
determining the adequacy of Section 36 must also be sought from case law. 
5.9 Telecom Corporation of New Zealand Limited v Clear Communications 
Limitei
44 currently encapsulates the role of Section 36 as a Ipechanism in 
pricing of access issues. In summary, various commentators including Ross 
145 146 147 .. 
Patterson, Charles Sweeney and others assert the dec1s1on has 
rendered Section 36 ineffectual for its stated purposes in access issues. It is 
accepted, seemingly, that Telecom was not under any general duty to assist 
Clear, but the criticism of the Privy Council decision rests on the very 
narrow interpretation the Court gave to "use" of a dominant position in 
terms of the section arising from a reluctance to "set" prices. By so doing, 
Telecom was able to escape sanction for its pricing methodology, 
notwithstanding other constituent parts of Section 36 were breached. 
5.10 The interpretative thrust of case law in respect of Section 36, as outlined in 
section 3 of this paper has undermined the political aspirations for the 
section. Section 36 is overtly an economic tool, but successive decisions in 
recent years have slowly chipped away the economic interpretation of 
Section 36 to the point where it is clear the section is now interpreted more 
in terms of the ordinary meaning of the words of the section. Ironically, the 
Court in earlier Telecom proceedings
148 indicated markets, dominance and 
competition are all economic terms but nevertheless favoured an ordinary 
meaning approach. The Privy Council has continued this thrust. The Privy 
Council considered Telecom did intend to deter competition and was in a 
dominant position. Nevertheless, the Privy Council decided Telecom did 
See footnote 8 
See footnote 97 
See the National Business Review, November 4, 1994, Privy Council Creates Headache for 
New 
Zealand 
See for example the Independent, July 7, 1995, Article on Telecom and Clear by N Mandow 
See footnote 91 page 441 
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not use its dominant position. A dominant position would not be used 
unless the party acts in a way a person not in a dominant position would 
t 149
 ac. 
5.11 This part of the judgment appears to have been misinterpreted or 
misreported as more appropriately "use" of a dominant position is not 
evident if a party acts in a way an alternative party not in a dominant 
position would act. The Privy Council considered it dangerous to argue that 
the presence of an anti-competitive purpose translated to use of a dominant 
position.
150 On this basis, the Privy Council considered the Baumol/Willig 
rule was not use of a dominant position and was accepted as an appropriate 
model for what would be charged in a perfectly contestable market. 
5.12 What are the consequences for the adequacy of Section 36 in assisting 
pricing of access issues if such a result occurs? Two aspects illustrate. 
First, the classic Australian decision on Section 46 of the Trade Practice Act 
1974 is not consistent with the Privy Council's approach.
151 As the 
language between the sections is similar, commentary on the Australian 
decision may indicate just how incorrectly Telecom has been decided. 
Secondly, can the Privy Council's decision be in any way beneficial to 
arguing Section 36 does guarantee access to Essential Facilities? Are the 
requirements identified in this section of the paper, of certainty and 
uniformity promoted? 
5.13 First, in Queensland Wire Industries Pty Limited v The Broken Hill Pty 
Company Limited, 
152 BHP produced a fencing device described as a Y Bar. 
Y Bars were an integral part of a star picket post. BHP refused to supply 
Y Bars to Queensland Wire Industries, since that company wished to 
See footnote 8 page 403 
See footnote 8 page 403 
See Queensland Wire Industries Pty Limited v The Broken Hill Pty Company Limited (I 989) 167 
CLR 
177 
See footnote 151 
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compete with BHP in making star picket posts. Later, supplies were made 
but at inflated prices. The relevant Australian provision, Section 46 of the 
Trade Practices Act 1974, appears in the Appendix. The Court held BHP to 
be in a position to substantively control the market and had a substantial 
degree of market power. 
153 
5.14 The Court determined the presence of BHP's market power enabled BHP to 
manipulate the supply of Y Bars. The Court considered the words of 
section 46 to "take advantage of' its position did not require hostile intent. 
Merely to do so was to "use" its position. Further, it was clearly only 
because of its position that BHP could act as it did, specifically, there was 
an absence of competitive conditions, whereas inferentially BHP could not 
have done so in truly competitive conditions. The test from Queensland 
Wire Industries Pty Limited v The Broken Hill Pty Company Limited1
54 
seems consistent with New Zealand intent prior to decision in Telecom 
Corporation of New Zealand Limited v Clear Communications Limited1
55 
Divergence however now seems apparent. The courts in Australia did not 
require evidence of intent and draw inferences from the facts . 
5.15 Secondly, can Telecom Corporation of New Zealand Limited v Clear 
Communications Limited1
56 be interpreted as an indication Section 36 
guarantees access to Essential Facilities? In fact, this section argues the 
decision has little to do with access regimes. This paper argues the decision 
does no more than assert, in the Privy Council's view, Telecom's pricing 
methodology did not offend Section 36. The decision has not provided a 
blanket regime to determine the mechanism of access. This is the greatest 
difficulty flowing from the Telecom Corporation of New Zealand Limited v 
Clear Communications Limited1
57
• The decision directs attention to an 
See footnote 151 pages 193 and 197 
See footnote 151 
See footnote 8 
See footnote 8 
See footnote 8 
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interpretation of Section 36, but by so doing obscures that the decision does 
not assist Section 36 put in place a certain and uniform access regime for 
Essential Facilities. Accordingly alternatives to Section 36 need to be 
pursued. This paper will now argue alternative or complementary regimes 
to Section 36 for access purposes, are clearly necessary on the basis that 
asking Section 36 to regulate access is asking that to perform a function for 
which it is not designed. 
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6. Alternative or Complementary Mechanisms of Determination? 
158 
6.1 To consider that there may be alternative mechanisms pursuant to which 
access to Essential Facilities may be determined could be construed as 
acknowledging Section 36 supposedly the guarantor of access is inadequate 
for its appointed purpose. Yet, as this paper argues, the characteristics of 
Section 36 appear to demand that there be alternatives. But perhaps this is 
too harsh an indictment on Section 36. Perhaps suggesting alternatives to 
Section 36 may be no more than recognising the limitations of the language 
of the section and, as illustrated in this paper, that Section 36 is not an 
access regime generally, but seeks not to prevent competitive entry to 
markets. On this basis, it may be more accurate to suggest alternatives to 
Section 36 are in fact complementary to Section 36. 
6.2 Remembering however that it is an argument of this paper that the status of 
access needs to be treated more importantly, this section looks at other 
mechanisms than Section 36 to which resort is made when a party seeks 
access to Essential Facilities. The intention is to ascertain in terms of 
paragraph 6.1, whether first, such mechanisms are indeed alternatives to 
Section 36, in the sense that they perform the same function or secondly 
whether they either complement or perform functions other than those of 
Section 36. Additionally, do certainty and uniformity of treatment of access 
issues follow? 
6.3 There are generally considered to be three alternative mechanisms to 
Section 36 as access regulators. They are, first the Essential Facilities 
Doctrine, 158 secondly Judicial Review and thirdly the Doctrine of Prime 
Necessities. Each of the three mechanisms themselves could be the subject 
of individual papers. This paper will not analyse the three mechanisms in 
such detail. Rather, this section will illustrate these alternatives ( or 
complements) to Section 36 lead to a conclusion that there may be other 
Note, this section now deals with the Essential Facilities Doctrine as opposed to defining Ess
ential 
Facilities which was the subject of section 2 of this paper. 
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ways to regulate access for certainty and uniformity and New Zealand 
should consider access issues in a sophisticated fashion to alleviate access 
difficulties. 
6.4 Notably, given the access regulation difficulties which this paper has 
highlighted as a characteristic of Section 36, each of the three mechanisms 
this section considers are themselves flawed by uncertainty as to application 
and relevance. Accordingly, this paper's treatment of them as illustrative of 
the requirement to treat access issues with some sophistication should be 
considered against that background. 
6.5 First, there is debate in New Zealand and in Australia as to whether the 
Essential Facilities Doctrine is recognised although case law has drawn on 
its influences.
159 Not surprisingly the origins of the Doctrine lie in United 
States of America case law, illustrated in Section 2 of this paper as also 
being the origins of the term "Essential Facilities" .
160 The modem authority 
for the Essential Facilities Doctrine however is MCI Communications 
Corporation v American Telephone and Telegraph.
161 MCI was engaged in 
providing private line communications for business and governmental 
organisations. MCI sued American Telephone and Telegraph alleging 
restraint of trade and monopolisation offences. 
6.6 MCI alleged American Telephone and Telegraphs facilities were essential 
to its operations, but MCI had been refused interconnection access on a 
reasonable basis. American Telephone and Telegraph campaigned against 
MCI's planned provision of other services. Further, it argued providing 
access to MCI was not in the public interest. The Court held the refusal of 
access to be unlawful.
162 A monopolist's control of an Essential Facility 
enables control from one production stage to another and between markets. 
See footnote 158. This paper distinguishes the Essential Facilities Doctrine and Essential Facilitie
s. 
See the cases at paragraphs 2.14 - 2.18 of this paper. 
708 F 2d 1081 (1983) 
See footnote 161 at page 113 3 
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Accordingly, anti trust laws require firms controlling Essential Facilities to 
make the facilities available to others on a non-discrimination basis. 
163 
6. 7 The Court considered four elements were necessary to establish liability to 
make access available to an Essential Facility under the Essential Facilities 
d · 164 octnne. First, there must be control of an Essential Facility by a 
monopolist. Secondly, a competitor must be unable to practically duplicate 
the facility. Thirdly, there must be a denial of use of the facility. Lastly, 
the feasibility of providing the doctrine must be considered. The Court 
considered American Telephone and Telegraph had no legitimate business 
reason for denying access to MCI to the interconnection facilities. 
165 The 
Essential Facilities Doctrine is well entrenched in United States of America 
case law, but this is not the position in New Zealand or Australia. 
6.8 There are some limitations of the Doctrine. Some consider the Doctrine is 
nothing more than a device to aid a determination of evidence disclosing 
inferentially, an anti-competitive intent. 
166 On their own, the four elements 
identified in MCI will not be sufficient to impose a duty to make access 
available, further facts will be necessary. 
167 Notably therefore, the Essential 
Facilities Doctrine on this basis does not act as or to provide an access 
regime. Resort to the Doctrine seeks to effect exactly the role Section 36 is 
doing, that is, identifying whether a party is acting anti-competitively. New 
Zealand case law illustrates the Essential Facilities Doctrine aius 
interpretation of Section 36, but does not determine or assist provision of an 
access regime to Essential Facilities.
168 
See footnote 161 at page 1132 
See footnote 161 at pages 1132 and 1133 
See footnote 161 at page 1133 
See footnote 15 page l 070 
See footnote 161, page 113 3, no legitimate business reason to deny access 
See following paragraph 
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6.9 In Aucldand Regional Authority v Mutual Rental Cars (Aucldand Airport) 
Limitei
69 Barker J drew again upon Hecht v Pro Football lnc
170 in 
defining the parameters of the Essential Facilities Doctrine. Barker J noted 
in that case 
171 
"Where facilities cannot practicably be duplicated by would be 
competitors those in possession of them must allow them to be 
shared on fair terms. It is illegal restraint of trade to foreclose the 
scarce facility. " 
New Zealand does not unanimously support the use of the Doctrine. In 
Union Shipping NZ Limited v Port Nelson Limited, 
172 the Court 
acknowledged its reluctance to import the Doctrine into New Zealand given 
the untested nature of the Doctrine at Appellate level in the United States of 
America 
6.10 The Australian position is similar. In the Federal Court in Queensland Wire 
Industries Pty Limited v The Broken Hill Pty Company Limited, 
173 the 
Doctrine was considered to be inappropriate to assist interpretation of that 
country's Section 36 equivalent. The Australian section was said not to 
readily accommodate the Doctrine.
174 Pengelley
175 argues this view refuses 
to recognise the economic basis to the Doctrine. The Doc.trine he says 
prevents denial of access or restriction on entry into a market.
176 Secondly, 
the Federal Court said the Essential Facilities Doctrine was also considered 
a gloss on the Sherman Act.
177 Pengelley is dismissive of this criticism.
178 
Further, the Federal Court said it could not determine the ambit of the 
See footnote 38 
See footnote 40 
See footnote page 38 page 680 
[ 1990] 2 NZLR 662 at page 704 
The Federal Court decision, ( 1988) A TPR 40-841 
See footnote 173 page 49,076 
Pengelley W, the Essential Facilities Doctrine and the Federal Court (1988) 4 Australian and N
ew 
Zealand TPA and MLB (no 4) 57 
See footnote 175 page 59 
See footnote 173 page 49,076 
See footnote 175 page 60 
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Doctrine. 
179 Again Pengelley says this is a doubtful reason not to recognise 
th D 
. 180 
e octnne. 
6.11 More importantly for access purposes, the Federal Court in Queensland 
Wire Industries Pty Limited v The Broken Hill Pty Company Limitei
81 
considered it was not the best forum to be demanding a party give access to 
an Essential Facility. This is somewhat unsatisfactory. Whilst it is 
recognised the Essential Facilities Doctrine is conducive to facilitating 
access
182
, this paper argues that in New Zealand the Doctrine would be no 
more effective in determining the terms of access than Section 36 will be. 
Doubts as to the application do not produce certainty or uniformity. Given 
the Privy Council's restriction of the application
183 of Section 36 it is argued 
the Essential Facilities Doctrine should be regarded as a complement to 
Section 36 rather than an alternative. 
6.12 A second alternative to Section 36 guaranteeing access to Essential 
Facilities is said to arise in the area of Judicial Review of the actions of 
statutory bodies acting in accordance with their empowering statutes. It is 
immediately apparent, however, considerations of this nature do not involve 
considerations of the influences of Section 36 at all. This is 
notwithstanding access issues, both of denial and of pricing arise. Further, 
the Privy Council has considered whilst Judicial Review may be available, 
the prospects for successful challenges are very limited 
184
. In Mercury 
Energy Limited v Electricity Corporation of New Zealand Limited1
85
, the 
parties entered into a preliminary agreement for the new commercial 
environment but could not read a final agreement. ECNZ gave notice to 
terminate the preliminary agreement. Mercury Energy sought various relief 
to keep the agreement on foot until final agreement was reached. 
See footnote 173 pages 49,076 and 49,077 
See footnote 175 page 60 
See footnote 173 
In the sense that the criteria if met, assists the grant of access. 
See footnote 8 
See footnote 185 following, page 388 
[1994] 2 NZLR 385 
WG95 1420.05 lslp48v41 + 
186 
187 
188 
189 
- 49 -
6.13 Whilst most causes of action were struck out, the Judicial Review relief was 
appealed to the Privy Council. The Privy Council held in principle, the 
actions of ECNZ were amenable to review as it constituted a Public Body. 
Nevertheless, such a review involved interfering with a body acting 
pursuant to statutory powers. Only plausible allegations such as acting 
other than in accordance with the law might bring relief. Unreasonableness 
in the sense of bad faith or ulterior motives might qualify
186
. Realistically 
therefore such a step is not a viable alternative to Section 36. In Air New 
Zealand Limited v Wellington International Airport Company Limited1
87 
various airlines banded together to challenge the Airport Company's landing 
fees structure. Their challenge failed. In terms of judicial review however 
the Court noted 
188 the Airport did not have a free hand. It was bound by 
statute to act as a commercial undertaking. The Airport had certain 
obligations. It could not act haphazardly, but must act efficiently. The 
court was satisfied the legislative intent was as long as the Airport acted 
properly in accounting and managerial matters, costs recovery on more than 
one basis was permissible. Acting commercially did not connote only one 
method of operation. Again, therefore there is little to indicate judical 
review is a viable alternative to Section 36. 
6.14 A third alternative to Section 36 is the Doctrine of Prime Necessities. At 
common law, monopoly suppliers of certain necessities, such as water are 
obliged to supply such necessities in exchange for receipt of a reasonable 
price and without unreasonable discrimination
189
. Importantly whilst 
arguably the Essential Facilities Doctrine perhaps complements and aids 
interpretation of Section 36, the Prime Necessities Doctrine is a separate 
common law mechanism, established by a long line of cases. 
See footnote 185 page 391 
See footnote 62 
See footnote 62 pages 18-45 
Said to originate from Lord Hales "Treatise de Portibus Maris" Essay in the late Seventeenth Century 
see footnote 62 page l 1 
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6.15 Consideration of several classic decisions will suffice. As has been 
discussed, Section 36 applies only where a dominant position is used for a 
proscribed purpose 1
90
• Arguably, as Telecom Corporation of New Zealand 
Limited v Clear Communications Limited'
91 illustrates, a refusal to allow 
access to an Essential Facility, or allowing access only on unreasonable 
terms may not constitute a breach of Section 36. Accordingly, as an 
alternative to Section 36, the Doctrine of Prime Necessities needs to be 
viewed as filling a gap in remedial action for disgruntled parties where 
access is otherwise denied. Further, to invoke the Doctrine of Prime 
Necessities will necessarily require the Prime Necessity to also be an 
Essential Facility. 
6.16 The elements of the Doctrine of Prime Necessity seem clearly 
established 192. There must be the presence of a Public Utility or other body. 
That Utility or other body must have a practical monopoly and be supplying 
a service or commodity of Prime Necessity. Further, the supply must be 
made at a reasonable price and without discrimination. 
6.17 In Dominion of Canada v City of Levis
193
, the court was asked to compel 
the City of Levis to supply water to a Governmental building. Although 
supply had been offered, the parties could not agree on price and ultimately 
was cut off. Under the relevant statute, no exemption from payment was 
available to the government. Without statutory authority existing, the court 
considered the government obligated to pay a fair and reasonable price
194
. 
Further, water was a matter of prime necessity and it would be inconvenient 
to exclude government buildings only on a basis of their not being liable for 
taxation. Accordingly, the court implied an obligation that water be 
See paragraph 3.5 of this paper as an example 
See footnote 8 
Land J. The Prime Necessities Doctrine: Where Does It Fit? Sixth Workshop, Competition Law and 
Policy Institute of New Zealand, Wellington 4-6 August 1995 
[1919] AC 505 
See footnote I 93 page 513 
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supplied in return for payment, outside of the express rights of any 
statute
195
• As to a "reasonable price", the court noted a consistent fee was 
requested over several years, but an increase sought with increased 
consumption. The court considered the fee "not unreasonable" but little 
more reason was discernible 1
96
. 
6.18 This decision has been applied in New Zealand. In State Advances 
Superintendent v Auckland City Counci/
197
, the court held that where a 
water supply authority has a practical monopoly, there is a requirement to 
supply water to all who seek it provided a fair and reasonable price is paid. 
Similarly, in Wairoa Electric Power Board v Wairoa Borough 1
98
, the Board 
was considered to have a monopoly of a commodity of Prime Necessity, 
electrical energy. As there was nothing in the statute from which the Board 
gained its authority to supply, to indicate otherwise, the Court implied that 
supply would be made on fair and reasonable terms 1
99
. 
6.19 A similar result followed in South Taranaki Electric Power Board v Patea 
Borough200 . The Board sought declarations, following a disagreement with 
the Borough as to the price it charged for electrical supply, that its charges 
were reasonable. The Board also sought declarations it was not a monopoly 
and the Levi/01 decision did not apply. The court held since previously 
supply had been made there were no grounds to now interrupt the supply. 
Further the Levis decision
202 did apply and electricity even if not a 
commodity, was merchantable and a prime necessity
203
. Interestingly, the 
decision of whether the price requested was fair, was referred to the 
Registrar and an Accountant, or to some other referee
204
. 
See footnote 193 page 513 
See footnote 193 page 514 
[ 1932] NZLR 1709 
[1937]NZLR211 
See footnote 198 page 216 
[1955] NZLR 954 
See footnote 193 
See footnote 193 
See footnote 200 page 960 
See footnote 200 
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6.20 Finally, in New Zealand Rail Limited v Port Marlborough New Zealand 
Limited1-
05
, New Zealand Rail brought proceedings claiming a right to use 
Port Marlborough's facilities on payment of a reasonable fee. Port 
Marlborough sought discovery of financial records of New Zealand Rail 
who resisted
206
. The court looked to see whether a reasonable fee was 
payable and how would that fee be determined. The court held it was 
permissible for different formulae to be used and New Zealand Rail 
information was relevant to determine and appropriate formula. New 
Zealand Rail appealed and on appeal the court held assessment of a proper 
fee would be focused on the Port Terminal, including the assets employed 
and the costs of running in a notionally competitive market
207
. 
6.21 The profitability of New Zealand Rail was not considered a matter in issue, 
such that discovery of its financial information has restricted. Relevantly, 
however, the court's assessment of a reasonable fee arises issues of whether 
the courts are able to determine the efficient level of pricing
208
. 
6.22 Contrast the application of the Doctrine of Prime Necessities with Essential 
Facilities209 as defined. Ownership of the facility appears to be irrelevant. 
Publicly and privately owned facilities are subject to the Doctrine. Whereas 
previously State Owned ownership of Essential Facilities would have meant 
little role for the Doctrine of Prime Necessities as access would have been 
freely available, arguably privately owned facilities in fact require greater 
policing which the Doctrine of Prime Necessities may assist. 
6.23 Despite privatisation, Essential Facilities do characterise practical 
monopolies210 . Duplication of network facilities will not be economically 
[1993) 2 NZLR 641 
See footnote 205 page 643 
See footnote 205 page 644 
See footnote 205 page 644 
In this sense, "Essential Facilities" not the "Doctrine" of Essential Facilities 
In the sense that as network facilities , duplication is not economically feasible 
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feasible but, does the Doctrine fail at the final consideration in terms of the 
nature of the commodity or service? This paper has defined Essential 
Facilities as former state owned network facilities. These are such as 
telecommunications grids and eiectricity grids. Yet are these similarly 
considered Prime Necessities and vice versa? Water and electricity are 
clearly so
211 . Sewerage and rubbish services are not so clearly 
d · d212 etermme . Interestingly, port services and telephone services have not 
specifically fallen for determination. United States of America case law 
suggests a lack of clarity as to ambit and this paper too has difficulty 
accepting Prime Necessities are necessarily Essential Facilities. 
6.24 Importantly in terms of this paper, access provided on the basis of payment 
of a fair and reasonable fee again does not establish an access regime. The 
cases have not determined with certainty and uniformity in establishing the 
basis for a fair and reasonable fee. Yet, note the subtle difference in 
accessing Prime Necessities rather than Essential Facilities. Access is 
available to Prime Necessities under that Doctrine. The issue was to 
determine price. With Essential Facilities access may be denied without the 
parties ever discussing price. The concepts do not serve the same ends. 
6.25 This section of the paper has looked to determine whether there are 
alternatives or complements to Section 36 in determining access to 
Essential Facilities. This section has argued that in fact three of the more 
commonly touted alternatives to Section 36 in fact serve as either aids to 
interpretation of Section 36 or as performing complementary roles not so 
much to Section 36 but to determining access as to terms and as to price. 
As indicated at the outset to this section to achieve both certainty and 
uniformity in the provision of access New Zealand needs to invoke other 
methods to regulate access to Essential Facilities. 
See footnote 192 pages 7 and 8 
See footnote 192 pages 7 and 8 
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IV PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE 
7. Is Regulation Preferable? 
213 
7.1 This paper asks, is Section 36 adequate to guarantee access to Essential 
Facilities? To provide an answer this paper has first, defined Essential 
Facilities so that an appreciation of facilities which are essential is obtained. 
Secondly, issues relating to the strength and weaknesses of Section 36 have 
been identified. Thirdly, access issues have been canvassed to identify 
specific requirements. Thereafter this paper has drawn these areas together 
and provided some indication of the adequacy of Section 36 to guarantee 
access. This paper is drawn to the conclusion that Section 36 is inadequate 
for its stated purpose. This paper has then considered whether some 
apparent alternatives or complements to Section 36 were satisfactory and 
addressed those situations which Section 36 did not. Again, this paper has 
concluded the requirements for access have not been met. 
7.2 This section of the paper then, suggests there is yet a further alternative to 
Section 36 and that is, in some respects a retreat back to the safety of 
regulation and provision of a specific access regime from which the desired 
certainty and uniformity of treatment of access issues can result. This 
section of the paper, first looks at the report of the Hilmer Committee in 
Australia, 213 . which has s· 1ggested a specific legislative regime in that 
country would be appropriate to guarantee access to Essential Facilities. 
Secondly, this paper also looks at access proposals from the MUMS group 
in New Zealand which supports the concepts the Hilmer Report suggests 
even though not duplicating those concepts entirely. The MUMS group 
suggests similarly a specific access regime would be beneficial in New 
Zealand. The form of a specific access regime is not settled however and 
this section also looks at alternative dispute resolution. Irrespective of 
F.G. Hilmer, Independent Committee of Inquiry into a National Competition Policy (A J Law, 
Commonwealth Government Printer, Canberra 1993) called the "Hilmer Report" 
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settlement of the final form of an access regime, this section concludes 
regulation is preferable to the current position. 
7.3 Beginning with the Hilmer Report, given the desire to harmonise New 
Zealand and Australia business laws, the report is instructive. An initial 
observation is the Hilmer Report reveals Australia has very similar concerns 
to New Zealand in its objectives to reform its economy, enhance its living 
standards and cement a national competition policy.
214 There is recognition 
free and open competition is "The engine which drive efficiency".
215 
Accordingly, achieving efficiency and economic growth and social 
objectives requires vigorous competition but not excessive conduct. The 
Hilmer Report considers aspects of access to Essential Facilities against this 
background.
216 
7.4 The Hilmer Report concurs that the introduction of effective competition 
requires competitors have access to facilities which exhibit natural 
monopoly characteristics and hence cannot be duplicated economically.
217 
Similarly, the Hilmer Report agrees there is little obvious agreement as to 
d f . . f 218 the terms of granting access an o pncmg o access. As in New 
Zealand, the potential to impose monopoly pricing or to covertly deny 
access is recognised. In the absence of structural reform of Essential 
Facilities, or at least meaningful structural reform, the Hilmer Report 
further recognises there is a challenge to provide a mechanism to encourage 
competition by protecting the interests of potential new entrants whilst 
ensuring the owner of the Essential Facilities 1s not unduly 
d. d d 219 1sa vantage . 
See footnote 213 page 2 
Australian Prime Minister Paul Keating quoted in the Hilmer Report - page I 
See footnote 213 pages I and 2 
See footnote 213 page 240 
See footnote 213 page 253 
See footnote 213 page 257 
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7.5 In summary, the Australian position mirrors New Zealand's difficulties. 
Submissions to the Hilmer committee indicated a lack of confidence the 
Section 36 equivalent in Australia
220 was adequate to provide access to 
Essential Facilities for exactly the reasons articulated in Section 5 of this 
paper.
221 Nevertheless, the Hilmer committee was conscious to look to 
limit the circumstances in which one entity would be required by law to 
make access to its facilities available to another. As is commonly 
expressed, a balance of public interest and protection of owners incentives 
for investment need be made. On this basis, the Hilmer committee 
expressed support for a legislated right of access. 
222 
7 .6 There is however recognition such an approach must also include provision 
to ensure efficient competitive activity occurs with a minimum of 
uncertainty and delay in access issues. The Hilmer committee was not 
convinced such a requirement demanded industry specific legislation as in 
its view whilst industry generally may have unique characteristics, access 
must involve common considerations. Additionally, the Hilmer committee 
considered lessons could easily be learned for industry wide benefit from a 
1. · 223 more genera 1st regime. 
7.7 With these objectives, the Hilmer committee looked at general rules in 
creating an access regime,
224 considering first, when should an access 
regime be created. The report considered this aspect to require a practicaI 
decision in the public interest, ultimately a discretionary legislative step. In 
this instance, the public interest would require access to enable effective 
competition in an upstream or downstream activity. Further, the 
significance of the industry and the impact of competition would need to be 
considered. Again, the interests of the facility owners would also require 
Section 46, Trade Practices Act (Australia) 1974 
See footnote 213 page 24 7 
See footnote 213 page 248 
See footnote 213 page 248 
See footnote 213 pages 250 to 260 
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safeguarding. Such steps too, it is suggested, should be subject to vetting 
before an independent body, but if approved then be enforceable. 
7 .8 The Hilmer Report next considered, once having established users rights of 
access, the pricing of access. In short, a fair and reasonable fee should be 
payable. The report recognises neither economic theory nor general notions 
of fairness determine an appropriate fee. Nevertheless, pricing issues 
require considerations of the extent of use of the capacity of the facility, 
proposed utilisation, recovery of capital costs and the impact of incentives 
to continue to upgrade and maintain facilities. If prices are too low, 
investment is not encouraged and conversely if too high, access is deterred. 
The report considered either a Minister or independent regulator of prices 
might be appropriate, generally favouring a Ministerial involvement. In the 
event of failure of agreement, arbitrations should be available. 
7.9 Thirdly, protection of the interests of the facility owner included a need not 
to unduly impede the owners use of the facility. Does the owner have 
priority of access and is preference similarly given to objectively 
determined efficiency related users? Clearly standard provisions could not 
be envisaged. The report next recognised some additional safeguards might 
be necessary to protect competitors. Particularly, the report says such steps 
would be relevant in a newly competitive market. On this basis, such steps 
may be necessary only on an interim basis until competition has established 
itself. During the protective period however, costs, data, public access 
agreements and general competitive rules could be required. Ministerial 
protection is a further option. 
7.10 The Hilmer Report also suggests remedies where access negotiations fail. 
Particularly, the report favours an arbitration process, commercially binding 
upon the parties. If ignored or abused, civil actions for injunctions or 
damages should be available. Pecuniary penalties are a further option. 
Finally, outside of the Hilmer Report access regime suggestions, individual 
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legislation similarly provides access requirements. The Hilmer Report sees 
such alternatives continuing in a complementary fashion unless a party 
considered that alternative to be unduly restrictive, discriminatory or 
detrimental. In such an instance access to the Hilmer Report regime would 
be available. 
7.11 In recognition of the peculiarities of the Australian State and Federal 
political system, the Hilmer committee received submissions as to whether 
"State" owned Essential Facilities should be treated any differently than 
privately owned facilities.225 Whilst some concession to characteristics of 
State ownership was made, in general the Hilmer committee considered its 
access regime would be applicable irrespective. 
7.12 Can New Zealand take any cognisance of the suggestions emanating from 
the Hilmer Report? Clearly our political system is structurally different 
both as to Federal and State distinctions but also too, as to the degree of 
regulation of industry and commerce. The high degree of potential 
ministerial involvement in the Hilmer proposals is totally inconsistent with 
New Zealand's current support of high-handed regulation. For example 
whilst the Act provides for price control, as pointed out in the Privy 
Council, there have been sufficient indications the Government will not 
resort to implementation of such controls. Accordingly New Zealand may 
have some conceptual hesitation. 
7.13 This paper argues however that some form of arbitration process is 
recognised as a pre-requisite for determining access issues.
226 
The MUMS 
group in New Zealand consists of a diverse group of network facilities 
users.227 The group has strong views contained in a report to the Ministry 
of Commerce that a specific access regime is preferable to Section 36 as a 
See footnote 213 page 250 
See the Hilmer Report and the MUMS group proposals following 
Includes a collection of major users of monopoly services such as Electrical, Airline, Courier and 
Stevedore groups 
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guarantor of access to Essential Facilities. The MUMS group have 
d · . 228 expresse some access regime reqmrements. The primary objective of an 
access regime should be to create a competitive environment in an upstream 
or downstream market. To do so, the parties should initiate the process 
which should be timely, cost effective, should resolve the issues in a 
predictable fashion and be economically efficient.
229 In terms of the Hilmer 
Report, such a regime would be charged with ensuring access to Essential 
Facilities followed where competition was promoted on an economically 
efficient basis in the public interest. Would such a regime enable each 
parties' business interests be recognised? Would the Essential Facilities 
owners interests and incentives be safeguarded? If the aims of the Act are 
to promote competition in an efficient manner then a facilitative access 
process is essential and certainly preferable to Section 36 and its limitations. 
7.14 Is Arbitration the answer? What constitutes a suitable arbitration process? 
The MUMS group230 suggests an amendment to the Act, whereby an access 
arbitration process is implemented. The MUMS group suggests imposing a 
legal obligation upon an Essential Facilities owner to provide access unless 
for legitimate technical or commercial reasons, access should not follow.
23 1 
The access regime would apply to persons in a dominant position in a 
market offering goods or services, access to which is essential to enable a 
new entrant to supply goods or services in a market other than the market 
for the Essential Facility owner. Additionally access would be on the basis 
of further promoting competition in a market other than the market for the 
Essential Facility service. As can be seen this would encourage competition 
in markets other than that of the Essential Facility owner and consequently 
says the MUMS group promote competition. 
The MUMS group proposals, page 10 (unpublished) 
See footnote 228 pages 10-11 
See footnote 228 page 11 
See footnote 228 page 13 
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7.15 Access should be provided on international "best practice" standards 
including providing sufficient information for a considered access request 
to be made. The MUMS group says best practices are discernible by 
collating information from individual industries worldwide, as to 
competitive steps to be undertaken. Best practice, the MUMS group says, 
has been considered in the United States of America
232 and requires more 
than the minimum, the merely adequate or the merely appropriate. 
Additionally best practices would automatically continually upgrade in 
standard as research, practice and experience expand. 
233 
7.16 Clearly, the practical steps to be undertaken to provide access include an 
initial request to the Essential Facilities owner.
234 The Essential Facilities 
owner would respond with terms and price and if accepted, a contract 
concluded. In the event of dispute, the access arbitration process would be 
invoked, subject to time constraints. During the arbitration process all 
relevant documents would be tabled and pre-hearings, inspections and 
identification of issues determined. The MUMS group envisages 
circumventing the difficulties of defining "Essential Facilities" by looking 
more to situations where entities are in dominant positions. The Act, they 
say, has provided ample precedent for interpretative purposes. Further, 
"dominance" extends into areas outside of merely Essential Facilities so as 
to enable the arbitration process to be of wider application.
235 
7.17 The MUMS group also suggests a "half-way house" during the arbitration 
process. They suggest that if the parties do not agree on terms of access 
when requested then during the arbitration process the access seeker would 
be entitled to access on the terms suggested by the Essential Facilities 
owner and the Essential Facilities owner would be obliged to supply on 
those terms. At the end of the arbitration process an adjustment of the 
See footnote 228 page 14 quoting Schafer's Case 872 F. Supp 689 (1995) 
See footnote 228 page 14 
See footnote 228 pages 15-16 
See footnote 228 pages 15-16 
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parties positions would be made depending on whether, for example, price 
was too high or too low at the outset or if more or less favourable terms 
result. On this basis the Essential Facilities owner would not be able to 
delay either directly or indirectly access to the Essential Facility.
236 
7.18 The MUMS group suggests the dispute resolution process should be the 
traditional single arbitrator/umpire model although they are not adverse to 
such as a panel of experts. The key according to the MUMS group is that 
the process be initiated quickly and then tightly constrained. On this basis 
various time periods would be imposed for each step of the process but the 
MUMS group envisage the dispute resolution process beginning no later 
than 12 weeks from the date of the initial request with a requirement that a 
result be given within perhaps four weeks from the completion of the 
process. The MUMS group see their suggestions as both promoting 
competition by removing delays to the process but also promoting 
economic sufficiency because of the cross market influences and areas in 
which access is to be made available. 
237 
7.19 This paper argues a specific access regime to Essential Facilities is 
preferable to the current position whereby Section 36 is asked to perform a 
function it is not equipped to do. Further, the Hilmer Report is a 
comprehensive study into providing certainty and uniformity for access. 
The MUMS group proposals similarly support the general theme of th..! 
Hilmer Report. Do the Hilmer Report and the MUMS group proposals 
provide the final answer however?. 
7.20 Contrast the MUMS group proposal with, say, an Alternative Dispute 
Resolution process. Such processes are becoming increasingly popular as 
alternatives to perceived cost, time and procedural deficiencies of the 
traditional judicial system. In a speech to the Arbitrators Institute of New 
See footnote 228 pages 15-16 
See footnote 228 page 16. 
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Zealand's annual conference, on 21 July 1995, the Minister of Commerce 
noted methods other than litigation are being demanded to settle disputes. 
Costs, privacy concerns and process control are cited as reasons for the 
desire for alternatives. The Minister considered Alternative Dispute 
Resolution presented an opportunity to resolve issues with a business 
approach rather than a legal approach. Some difficulties were noted in the 
area of Essential Facilities where regulating ongoing relationships or 
defending of principles might require a more formal resolution of a 
commercial dispute 
7.21 Gunderson and Thomson23
8 argue nevertheless most commercial disputes 
are resolved pursuant to some form of Alternative Dispute Resolution in 
any event, and litigation does not often proceed to full conclusion. In this 
regard Alternative Dispute Resolution is quite usual. Nevertheless the two 
main forms of Alternative Dispute Resolution are Arbitration and 
Mediation. Whilst arbitration is a form of Alternative Dispute Resolution, 
Gunderson and Thomson query whether mediation on an even less formal 
basis has a role to play. Arbitration as illustrated by the Hilmer Report and 
the MUMS group proposals is still a formal process both procedurally and 
on the basis of the decisions made by an arbitrator. Mediation on the other 
hand is certainly designed as a facilitative process whereby options and 
alternatives are considered to reach a consensual agreement. The mediator 
facilitates the result and does not express opinions or offer advice.
239 
7.22 Mediation is seen as a "win-win" situation, thus avoiding a breakdown of 
relationships. Further, creative solutions can be achieved unfettered by both 
precedent and formalised procedures. Nevertheless it must be queried 
whether it is realistic to have an expectation that hard nosed commercial 
competitors would submit to a mediation process. Gunderson and Thomson 
cite some successes,240 but not apparently with any relevance to access to 
B Gunderson and T Thomson, Alternative Dispute Resolution in the Commerce Act 1986, paper 
delivered to the Utility Markets Summit 27/28 April 1995. 
See footnote 238 page 4. 
See footnote 238 pages 4-5 . 
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Essential Facilities. The recent history of commercial access litigation 
reveals the parties will use the existing system to its fullest extent to protect 
their positions rather than look to facilitate access. Notwithstanding the 
aims of the Commerce Act 1986, to promote competition, an advantage 
achieved is not easily or willingly compromised. 
7.23 It is with some reluctance that this section of the paper concludes a specific 
access regime 1s necessary. In some respects such a conclusion is a 
backward step. Yet, it is clear certainty and uniformity produce a fair result 
in an area which is very important in promoting competition and efficiency. 
The present regime is unsupportable. 
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8. Conclusions 
241 
242 
243 
8.1 In response to the question this paper asks, is Section 36 adequate to 
guarantee access to Essential Facilities, the overwhelming conclusion is in 
fact, Section 36 is woefully inadequate. This paper has endeavoured 
however, to attribute the inadequacy of Section 36 not to the section itself, 
but to unrealistic political aspirations. Section 36 is envisaged to be a 
facilitative economic tool, yet is expressed only in language which is 
proscriptive of certain anticompetitive behaviour. 
8.2 Politically, Section 36 is indicative of light handed legislation where an 
absence of regulatory barriers is envisaged to promote competition. From 
competition, economic efficiency in the use of resources and consequently 
improved living standards were to flow. Deregulation and privatisation of 
Essential Facilities has been an integral part of this political process, on the 
premise private sector models would similarly improve efficiency. 
8.3 This paper argues, however that light handed legislation, deregulation and 
privatisation have not provided a climate for Section 36 to adequately to 
guarantee access to Essential Facilities. This paper has defined Essential 
Facilities in New Zealand.241 Merely by removing statutory protection from 
Essential Facilities does not make those facilities efficient. Whilst Telecom 
for example has been pr~vatised, the network facilities simply "became" 
Telecom's. Internal cultural and structural reforms are necessary when any 
Essential Facilities are privatised, although without simply replacing one set 
of regulations with another. 242 A failure to do so, is to risk entrenchment of 
h 
. . 243 
the state sector c aractenst1cs. 
See section 2 of this paper 
See Farmer JA at footnote 97 page 14 
Particularly, if former policy making procedures and other administrative tasks, for example, are not 
separated out from commercial tasks. 
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8.4 As New Zealand grapples with the implication of privatised Essential 
Facilities, so too the effects of the constituent parts of Section 36 have been 
difficult for the business community and the judiciary to assimilate. The 
paper has illustrated the difficulties244 with the consequence the political 
aspirations for Section 36 have been compromised. The compromise is 
graphically illustrated by raising access issues as a key concept. Access to 
certain Essential Facilities must be given if competition is to be promoted 
and economic efficiency to follow.
245 Yet, unless access can be provided to 
Essential Facilities on both certain and uniform terms, delays, disputes and 
inefficiencies will follow. 
8.5 This paper supports the conceptual thrust of the Hilmer Report and the 
MUMS group proposals246 that a legislated access regime to Essential 
Facilities is necessary to achieve commercial satisfaction. Such a regime 
would not be perfect. In particular some of the Hilmer Report's proposals 
appear unwieldy and too discretionary.
247There are, too, dangers of 
piecemeal or ad hoe legislative changes although such dangers are an 
incident of providing certainty and uniformity. Nevertheless, the MUMS 
group proposals contain some distinct advantages. The process the MUMS 
group envisages is subject to control by the participants but nevertheless 
removes some emotion.248 The process contains interim procedures to 
ensure momentum is continued. Finally, if arbitration is required a tight 
. bl d 1 . . . d 249 timeta e towar reso ution 1s envisage . 
8.6 If access to Essential Facilities is to be guaranteed so that economic 
efficiency is enhanced, Section 36 must be replaced as the mechanism to 
achieve the guarantee. The section is clearly inappropriate. The Hilmer 
Report but more importantly, the MUMS group proposals provide a 
See section 3 of this paper 
On the basis that it is inefficient and wasteful to require duplication of facilities 
See footnotes 213 and 228 respectively 
See for example Ministerial involvement, footnote 213 page 250 
See footnote 228 pages 15 and 16, time frames and interim steps suggested, arbitration if necessary 
See footnote 228 page 16 
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conceptual basis from which a specific access regime can result. 
Determination of access terms and pricing flow from a facilitative 
mechanism to provide workable competition and economic efficiency. 
Clearly light handed regulation is in demise. 
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V APPENDIX 
Section 36(1) 
No person who has a dominant position in a market shall use that position for the purpose of: 
(a) Restricting the entry of any person into that or any other market; or 
(b) Preventing or deterring any person from engaging in competitive conduct in that or 
in any other market; or 
( c) Eliminating any person from that or any other market. 
Section 2(1) 
"Person" includes a local authority, and any association of persons whether incorporated or 
not. 
Section 3(1A) 
Every reference in this Act, except the reference in section 36A(l)(b) and (c) of this Act, to 
the term "market" is a reference to a market in New Zealand for goods or services as well as 
other goods or serves that, as a matter of fact and commercial common sense, are 
substitutable for them. 
Section 3(8) 
For the purposes of sections 36 and 36A of this Act, a dominant position in a market is one in 
which a person as a supplier or an acquirer of goods or services either alone or together with 
any interconnected body corporate is in a position to exercise a dominant influence over the 
production, acquisition, supply, or price of goods or services in that market and for the 
purposes of determining whether a person is in a position to exercise a dominant influence 
over the production, acquisition, supply, or price of goods or services in a market regard shall 
be had to: 
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(a) The share of the market, the technical knowledge, the access to materials or capital 
of that person or that person together with any interconnected body corporate; 
(b) The extent to which that person is constrained by the conduct of competitors or 
potential competitors in that market; 
( c) The extent to which that person is constrained by the conduct of suppliers or 
acquirers of goods or services in that market. 
Section 2(5)(b) 
For the purposes of this Act; 
A person shall be deemed to have engaged, or to engage, in conduct for a particular purpose 
or a particular reason if: 
(i) That person engaged or engages in that conduct for that purpose or reason or for 
purposes or reasons that included or include that purpose or reason; and 
(ii) That purpose or reason was or is a substantial purpose or reason. 
Section 2 Sherman Act 
Every person who shall monopolise, or attempt to monopolise, or combine or 
conspire with any other person or persons to monopolise any part of the trade or 
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty 
of a misdemeanour. 
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Section 46(1) Trade Practices Act 1974 
A corporation that has a substantial degree of power in a market shall not take 
advantage of that power for the purpose of -
(a) eliminating or substantially damaging a competitor of the corporation or of 
a body corporate that is related to the corporation in that or any other 
market; 
(b) preventing the entry of a person into that or any other market; or 
( c) deterring or preventing a person from engaging in competitive conduct in 
that or any other market. 
Article 86 Treaty of Rome 
Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the common market or 
in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common market insofar 
as it may affect trade between Member States: 
Such abuse may, in particular, consist in: 
(a) directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling pnces or other unfair 
trading conditions; 
(b) limiting production, markets or technical development to the prejudice of 
consumers; 
(c) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties, 
thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage; 
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(d) making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of 
supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial usage, 
have no connection with the subject of such contracts. 
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